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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity ) 
as Attorney General Of Idaho, ex rei STATE ) Supreme Court 39084-2011 
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES, ) Ada County Docket No. 2010-23751 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE BOARD OF LAND ) 
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE ) 
BACON, in his official capacity as Director ) 
of the Idaho Department of Lands, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
GLADYS BABCOCK, et. AI., ) 
) 
Defendants-In-Intervention-Respondents ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION, ) 
INC., ) 
) 
Defendant Intervenor-Respondents ) 
) 
) 
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the Babcock ) 
TRUST, et. AI., ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) Valley County Docket No. 2010-436 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE BOARD OF LAND ) 
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE ) 
BACON, in his official capacity as Director ) 
of the Idaho Department of Lands, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley. 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge 
Presiding 
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Attorney General, State of Idaho 
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Boise, ID 83720 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE 
Merlyn Clark 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, ID 83720 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I Paae # I Volume # 
CV-2010-436-C Complaint (10/2212010) · ......... 1 I 
CV -201 0-436-C Amended Complaint (11/10/2010) · ......... 15 I 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Bob Brammer (11/18/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 1 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (1210212010) · ......... 30 I 
CV -OC-201 0-23751 Motion For Preliminary Injunction (1210212010) · ......... 49 I 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of Steven Strack (1210212010) SEE EXHIBIT 2 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Brief In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 52 I 
(1210212010) 
CV-2010-436-C Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract · ......... 82 I 
Claims (12109/2010) 
CV -2010-436-C Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial · ......... 87 I 
Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (12109/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Colleen D Zahn In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For · ......... 102 I 
Partial Summary Judgment (12109/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Motion to Intervene (Oberrecht for Babcock, et aL) 12110/2010) · ......... 115 I 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of Leaseholder W. Anthony Park In Support Of Motion SEE EXHIBIT 3 
To Intervene (12110/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Intervene (12110/2010) · ......... 142 I 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of George Bacon (12113/2010) · ......... 151 I 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of D. John Ashby (12113/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 4 
CV·OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of Bob Brammer (12113/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 5 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Memorandum In Opposition Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 154 I 
(12113/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 172 I 
(1211412010) 
CV -OC-201 0-23751 Order To Allow Babcock, et al. to Intervene (12116/2010) · ......... 180 I 
CV-2010-436-C Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate (12117/2010) · ......... 183 I 
CV-2010-436-C Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 188 
" (12117/2010) 
CV-20 1 0-436-C Affidavit of Mikela A. French In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To · ......... 216 
" I Consolidate (12117/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit of Anthony Park In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To SEE EXHIBIT 6 I 
Consolidate (12117/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Notice Of Lodging Of Proposed Order Granting Preliminary · ......... 221 II 
Injunction (12117/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Letter dated December 17, 2011 from counsel for Babcock, et al 
to Judge Bail & counsel for parties regarding Babcock et aI's 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 1 
Objection to proposed order for Preliminary Injunction lodged by NOT FOUND 
Attorney General with Court on December 17, 2011 
CV-OC·2010·23751 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (12117/2010) · ......... 224 
" CV-OC·2010·23751 Answer And Notice In Intervention (Phillip Oberrecht For Gladys · ......... 228 
" Babcock (12117/2010) 
CV -OC·201 0-23751 Notice Of Intervenors' Motion To Consolidate (Valley County · ......... 251 
" Case No. CV2010·436) (12117/2010) 
CV-OC-2010·23751 Motion To Strike or, Alternatively, Objection To Amendment To · ......... 320 
" Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (12120/2010) 
CV -201 0·436·C Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Support Of Opposition To · ......... 325 
" Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint, Or, In The 
Alternative, Motion To Stay (1212212010) 
CV-2010-436·C Stipulation For Dismissal Of Plaintiff Montford M. Brooks · ......... 369 II 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Motion For Summary Judgment And Incorporation Of Supporting · ......... 375 
" Brief (1212212010) 
CV-OC-2010·23751 Withdrawal Of Motion To Strike or, Alternatively, Objection To · ......... 378 
" Amendment To Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (12123/2010) 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Stipulation For Dismissal Without Prejudice Of 2nd and 3n1 Claims · ......... 385 
" For Relief (12123/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Defendants' Cross·Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: · ......... 388 
" Contract Claims (1/13/2011) 
CV-2010-436·C Stipulation To Dismiss Claims (1/20/2011) · ......... 391 III 
CV-2010-436-C Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Cross-Motion For · ......... 396 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims And In 
Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
(1/25/2011 ) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Meryl W. Clark (1/25/2011) · ......... 418 III 
CV-2010-436-C Second Affidavit Of Bob Brammer In Support Of Defendants' SEE EXHIBIT 7 
Cross-Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract 
Claims And In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment (1/25/2011) 
CV-2010·436-C Order Re: Stipulation To Dismiss Claims (1/26/2011) · ......... 455 III 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Support Of Motion For Order SEE EXHIBIT 8 
Sanctioning Defendants For Contempt (01/2712011) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit Of Leaseholder W. Anthony Park In Support Of Motion SEE EXHIBIT 9 
For Order Sanctioning Defendants For Contempt (01/2712011) 
CV-2010·436-C Affidavit Of Anne Herndon In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 460 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Jim Hancock In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 465 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
I CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of James T. Schulze In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 469 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 2 
CV·2010-436·C Affidavit Of Patricia T. Totten In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 476 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV·2010·436·C Plaintiffs Lessees' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' · ......... 480 III , 
Cross· Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: Contract 
I Claims (02110/2011) 
CV·2010·436·C Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross·Motion for · ......... 506 III I 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02117/2011) 
CV-2010·436·C Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate · ......... 517 III 
(02117/2011 ) 
CV -201 0·436·C Affidavit of Clay R. Smith In Support Of Memorandum In SEE EXHIBIT 10 
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate (02118/2011) 
CV-OC·2010·23751 Motion To Intervene As Defendant (0212212011) · ......... 532 
'" CV-OC·2010·23751 Affidavit Of Bert A Belles, Leaseholder And President Of Priest · ......... 535 11/ 
Lake State Lessees Association, Inc. In Support Of Motion To 
Intervene (0212212011) 
CV -201 0·436·C Reply In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 539 1/1 
(0212212011 ) 
CV-2010-436·C Limited Entry Of Appearance (02123/2011) · ......... 549 11/ 
CV-2010·436·C Stipulation Regarding Facts and Discovery (0212412011) · ......... 552 1/1 
CV-2010·436·C Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 556 
'" (03108/2011 ) 
CV-2010·436·C Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 564 1/1 I · ......... 
(03/21/2011 ) 
CV-2010·436·C Order For Intervention By Priest Lake State Lessees Association · ......... 567 III 
Inc. (03/2212011) 
CV-OC·2010·23751 Order Changing Venue To Valley County (03/29/2011) · ......... 570 
'" 
CV-2010·436·C Attorney General's Motion For Summary Judgment Re: WITHDRAWN 
Constitutionality of I.C. §58·310A (04119/2011) *Not in ISTARS 
- Document not in File - Phone call to counsel and reguest 
WITHDRAWN* 
CV·2010·436·C Plaintiffs'/lntervenors' Memorandum in Opposition to Attorney · ......... 572 III 
General's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of 
I.C. §58·310A (04119/2011) 
CV·2010·436·C Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Opposition To Attorney SEE EXHIBIT 11 I General's Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality 
I Of I.C. 58·310A (04119/2011) 
CV·2010·436·C Consolidated Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In · ......... 596 IV 
I Opposition To Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV·20 1 0·436·C Affidavit Of Charles B. Lempesis In Support Of Consolidated · ......... 618 IV 
Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 
(04121/2011 ) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 3 
CV-2010-436·C Affidavit Of Ed Morse, CRE MAl, In Support Of Consolidated · ......... 633 IV 
Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In OpPOsition To 
Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 
(04121/2011 ) 
CV-2010-436·C Affidavit Of Jennifer Lehn, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 636 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV-2010-436·C Affidavit Of Bert A. Belles, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 638 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated I Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV·2010-436·C Affidavit Of Ron Jensen, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 657 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV ·201 0-436·C Affidavit Of Mike Schmitz, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 659 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For · ......... 661 IV 
Summary Judgment (04127/2011) 
CV -201 0-436·C Memorandum Decision and Order in Re Contempt (05113/2011) · ......... 676 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Plaintiff Wasden's Request For Entry Of Final Judgment Under · ......... 684 IV 
I.R.C.P. 56(a) and (c) (06/07/2011) 
CV-2010-436·C Memorandum Decision On (1)Plaintiff Wasden's Request for · ......... 687 IV 
Entry of Final Judgment (2)Defendant Intervenor Priest Lake 
State Lessees Association's Motion for Mandatory Mediation 
(07/27/2011 ) 
CV·2010·436·C Notice of Appeal (0811 0/2011) · ......... 718 IV 
CV·2010·436·C Request for Additional Record (08/2412011) · ......... 727 IV I 
CV-2010·436·C Request for Additional Record (08/2412011) · ......... 730 IV 
CV-2010·436·C Notice of Cross Appeal (09/20/2011) · ......... 733 IV 
CV-OC·2010-23751 ROA Pages · ......... 739 IV 
CV·2010·436·C ROA Pages · ......... 741 IV 
CV·2010·436·C Certificate of Exhibits · ......... 751 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Certificate to Record · ......... 753 IV 
CV-2010·436·C Certificate of Service · ......... 755 IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 4 
INDEX [ I PaQe # I Volume # I 
CV·2010·436·C Affidavit Of Anne Herndon In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 460 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV ·201 0-436·C Affidavit of Anthony Park In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To SEE EXHIBIT 6 
Consolidate (12117/2010) I I 
CV·2010·436·C Affidavit Of Bert A. Belles, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 638 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In OPPOSition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV -OC·201 0·23751 Affidavit Of Bert A. Belles, Leaseholder And President Of Priest · ......... 535 III 
Lake State Lessees Association, Inc. In Support Of Motion To 
Intervene (0212212011) 
CV -201 0·436·C Affidavit Of Bob Brammer (11/18/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 1 
CV -OC·201 0·23751 Affidavit of Bob Brammer (12113/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 5 
CV-2010·436·C Affidavit Of Charles B. Lempesis In Support Of Consolidated · ......... 618 IV 
Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 
(04121/2011 ) 
CV -201 0·436-C Affidavit of Clay R. Smith In Support Of Memorandum In SEE EXHIBIT 10 
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate (0211812011) 
CV -2010-436-C Affidavit Of Colleen D Zahn In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For · ......... 102 I 
Partial Summary Judgment (12109/2010) 
CV -OC-20 10·23751 Affidavit of D. John Ashby (12113/2010) SEE EXHIBIT 4 
CV-2010·436·C Affidavit Of Ed Morse, CRE MAl, In Support Of Consolidated · ......... 633 IV 
Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 
(04121/2011 ) 
CV-OC·2010·23751 Affidavit of George Bacon (12113/2010) · ......... 151 I 
CV-201 0·436·C Affidavit Of James T. Schulze In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 469 11/ 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV-2010·436·C Affidavit Of Jennifer Lehn, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 636 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV·2010·436·C Affidavit Of Jim Hancock In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 465 11/ 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV·OC·2010·23751 Affidavit Of Leaseholder W. Anthony Park In Support Of Motion SEE EXHIBIT 9 
For Order Sanctioning Defendants For Contempt (01/2712011) 
CV·OC·2010·23751 Affidavit of Leaseholder W. Anthony Park In Support Of Motion SEE EXHIBIT 3 
To Intervene (12110/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Meryl W. Clark (1/25/2011) · ......... 418 III 
CV·2010-436·C Affidavit Of Mike Schmitz, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 659 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
INDEX - 1 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV -201 0-436-C Affidavit of Mikela A. French In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To · ......... 216 
" Consolidate (12117/2010) 
CV -201 0-436-C Affidavit Of Patricia T. Totten In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For · ......... 476 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02110/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Opposition To Attorney SEE EXHIBIT 11 
General's Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality 
Of I.C. 58-310A (04119/2011) 
CV -OC-201 0-23751 Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Support Of Motion For Order SEE EXHIBIT 8 
Sanctioning Defendants For Contempt (01/27/2011) 
CV -201 0-436-C Affidavit Of Phillip S. Oberrecht In Support Of Opposition To · ......... 325 
" Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint, Or, In The 
Alternative, Motion To Stay (1212212010) 
CV-2010-436-C Affidavit Of Ron Jensen, In Support Of Consolidated Defendant · ......... 657 IV 
Intervenor's Memorandum In Opposition To Consolidated 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Affidavit of Steven Strack (1210212010) SEE EXHIBIT 2 
CV-2010-436-C Amended Complaint (11/10/2010) · ......... 15 I 
CV -OC-201 0-23751 Answer And Notice In Intervention (Phillip Oberrecht For Gladys · ......... 228 
" Babcock (12117/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Attorney General's Motion For Summary Judgment Re: WITHDRAWN 
Constitutionality of I.C. §58·310A (04/19/2011) *Not in ISTARS 
- Document not in File - Phone call to counsel and reguest 
WITHDRAWN* 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Brief In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 52 I 
(1210212010) 
CV-2010-436-C Certificate of Exhibits · ......... 751 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Certificate of Service · ......... 755 IV 
CV -201 0-436-C Certificate to Record · ......... 753 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Complaint (10/2212010) · ......... 1 I 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (1210212010) · ......... 30 I 
CV-2010-436-C Consolidated Defendant Intervenor's Memorandum In · ......... 596 IV 
OpPOSition To Consolidated Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment (04121/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: · ......... 388 
" Contract Claims (1/13/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for · ......... 506 
'" Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (02117/2011) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Letter dated December 17, 2011 from counsel for Babcock, et al 
to Judge Bail & counsel for parties regarding Babcock, et ai's NOT FOUND 
Objection to proposed order for Preliminary Injunction lodged by 
Attorney General with Court on December 17, 2011 
INDEX- 2 
CV·2010-436-C Limited Entry Of Appearance (02123/2011) · ......... 549 III 
CV·2010-436-C Memorandum Decision and Order in Re Contempt (05113/2011) · ......... 676 IV 
CV·2010-436-C Memorandum Decision On (1 )Plaintiff Wasden's Request for · ......... 687 IV 
Entry of Final Judgment (2)Defendant Intervenor Priest Lake 
State Lessees Association's Motion for Mandatory Mediation 
(07/27/2011 ) 
CV-2010-436-C Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 556 III 
(03/08/2011 ) 
CV·OC-2010-23751 Memorandum In Opposition Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 154 I 
(12113/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate · ......... 517 III 
(02117/2011) 
CV -201 0-436-C Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Cross-Motion For · ......... 396 III 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims And In 
Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
(1/25/2011) 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Intervene (12110/2010) · ......... 142 I 
CV -2010-436-C Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 188 
" (12117/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Motion For Preliminary Injunction (1210212010) · ......... 49 I 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Motion For Summary Judgment And Incorporation Of Supporting · ......... 375 
" Brief (1212212010) 
CV -OC-2010-23751 Motion to Intervene (Oberrecht for Babcock, et at) 12110/2010) · ......... 115 I 
CV-OC·2010-23751 Motion To Intervene As Defendant (0212212011) · ......... 532 III 
CV-OC-2010·23751 Motion To Strike or, Alternatively, Objection To Amendment To · ......... 320 
" Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (12120/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Notice of Appeal (08/10/2011) · ......... 718 IV 
CV-2010·436-C Notice of Cross Appeal (09/20/2011) · ......... 733 IV 
CV-2010·436-C Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment · ......... 564 III 
(03/21/2011 ) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Notice Of Intervenors' Motion To Consolidate (Valley County · ......... 251 
" Case No. CV2010-436) (12117/2010) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Notice Of Lodging Of Proposed Order Granting Preliminary · ......... 221 
" Injunction (12117/2010) 
CV -OC·201 0-23751 Order Changing Venue To Val/ey County (03129/2011) · ......... 570 
'" CV-2010-436-C Order For Intervention By Priest Lake State Lessees Association · ......... 567 11/ 
Inc. (03/2212011) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (12117/2010) · ......... 224 
" CV-2010-436-C Order Re: Stipulation To Dismiss Claims (1/26/2011) · ......... 455 III 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Order To Allow Babcock, et at to Intervene (12116/2010) · ......... 180 I 
CV·20 1 0-436-C Plaintiff Wasden's Request For Entry Of Final Judgment Under · ......... 684 IV 
INDEX - 3 
I.R.C.P. 56(a) and (c) (06107/2011) 
CV·2010-436-C Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate (12117/2010) · ......... 183 I 
CV·2010-436·C Plaintiffs Lessees' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' · ......... 480 11/ 
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: Contract 
Claims (02110/2011) 
CV·2010-436-C Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial · ......... 87 I 
Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims (12109/2010) 
CV·2010-436-C Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract · ......... 82 I 
Claims (12109/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Plaintiffs'''ntervenors' Memorandum in Opposition to Attorney · ......... 572 III 
General's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of 
I.C. §58-310A (04119/2011) 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction · ......... 172 I 
(1211412010) 
CV -201 0-436·C Reply In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate · ......... 539 III 
(0212212011 ) 
CV-2010-436-C Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For · ......... 661 IV 
Summary Judgment (04127/2011) 
CV -201 0-436-C Request for Additional Record (08/2412011) · ......... 727 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Request for Additional Record (08/2412011) · ......... 730 IV 
CV -OC-2010-23751 ROAPages · ......... 739 IV 
CV-2010·436-C ROA Pages · ......... 741 IV 
CV-2010-436-C Second Affidavit Of Bob Brammer In Support Of Defendants' SEE EXHIBIT 7 
Cross-Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract 
Claims And In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment (1/25/2011) 
CV-2010-436-C Stipulation For Dismissal Of Plaintiff Montford M. Brooks · ......... 369 
" CV-OC-2010-23751 Stipulation For Dismissal Without Prejudice Of 2nd and 3rd Claims · ......... 385 
" For Relief (12123/2010) 
CV-2010-436-C Stipulation Regarding Facts and Discovery (0212412011) · ......... 552 1/1 
CV-2010-436-C Stipulation To Dismiss Claims (1/20/2011) · ......... 391 III 
CV-OC-2010-23751 Withdrawal Of Motion To Strike or, Alternatively, Objection To · ......... 378 
" Amendment To Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 
(12123/201 0) 
INDEX - 4 
Phillip S. Oberrecht 
ISB #1904, pso@hallfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTO~, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395·8585 
W \4\4-6821 \PLEADINGS\Complaintdoc 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Case NO ___ ..Jnst.NG 
Fied ,J.M.-'~~f 3--_-~M-. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DfSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRUST; LAUR<\ L. BARCLAY; 
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST~ MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTON[OLI; MARTIN 1. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY 
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNE FIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; L ¥NNE KIN"NEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KIN'NEY TRUST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER. 
]V LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 'II 
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA 1. ANDERSON and. 
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DIN GEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DO~A DAY 
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
MARJORlE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN 
COMPLAINT - 1 
Case No. ~ V t O(D- 4- 310 ~ 
COMPLAINT 
1 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the I 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY. 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LlVING TRUST; LILA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRICKSON, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES i 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HrPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH 1 
HO]\;; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH~ STEVEN D. and DAWN 1. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the EST ATE OF 
CHARLES R. KlJ'\G, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LElSV F AMIL Y LAND TReST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEAr..TN ! 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA. as Trustee of the MILDRED 1. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERLY A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT 1. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
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Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KATY L. REYNOLDS; M]CHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EOW ARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the s-s 
F AMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDruC v. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARABARA SMITH. as Co-Trustees of the 
S:vtITH F AMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABJAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESUE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESUE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARt'v1STRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE, I 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP I 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; 
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN, 
PLaintiffs, 
vs. 
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS; 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
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COME NOW the above~named plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall, 
Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and for good cause against the above-named defendants, 
complain and allege as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County, 
Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant, Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"), 
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land 
Board and promises made to the Land Board. The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and 
remedies with respect to the parcels of real property. 
2. The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of 
the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's 
public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. 
3. Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands 
("Department of Lands"). The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho, 
established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-121, 
Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties, countersigning leases issued by the president 
of the Land Board for rental of state enduwment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state 
nonnal schools and the state hospital. 
II. 
JURISDICTION and VENUE 
4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they an either reside in 
or do business in the state of Idaho. 
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5. The amount in controversy exceeds the jUrisdictional minimum ofthis Court. 
6. The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County, 
Idaho. 
7. Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-40] . 
III. 
FACTS 
The Land Board's Constitutional and StatutOry Direction 
8. Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide 
for the rental of all state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such 
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which 
granted, or to the state if not specifically granted. 
9. Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state 
land at a rental amount fixed and detennined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307, 
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to 
thirty-five (35) years. 
10. The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real 
property which is leased for recreational residential purposes. Plaintiffs' leases all concerned 
cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases." 
11. Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be 
applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances, 
Idaho Code § 58-310 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to 
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore, with the annual rent to be established 
by the Land Board. However, Idaho Code § 58-310A provides that the conflict auction and 
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application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead, 
Idaho Code § S&·310A directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot 
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease. 
The Terms of the Currently Existio2: Cottage Site Leases 
12. The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state 
lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on 
January 1,2001. The existing leases will tenninate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board 
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site. 
13. The lease provides for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the 
leased premises, as determined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation 
is determined by the assessor. The rent is payable on or before January 1 of each year, and is 
paid one year in advance. Rent may increase or decrease effective January 1 of any calendar 
year, in accordance with the 2.5% formula. 
14. For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites 
arc valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on 
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will 
rely on lot values as established by the VaHey County Assessor. 
] 5. The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold 
approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal. 
16. If a request to renew is denied, the lease provides the Land Board will pay 
the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed on the leased 
premises. The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the 
improvements on the lease's expiration date. 
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17. In the event of an expiration or termination of the lease for any reason 
other than default by the lessee, and in the event Land Board leases the land to a new 
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board 
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or 
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to 
the prior lessee. 
18. The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently 
enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the 
lease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and 
laws of the state of Idaho or other govemmental entities. 
19. The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application 
and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58-310. 
20. Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs 
would be given a right to renew the leases on their current terms, and that Plaintiffs 
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed 
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or 
maintain valuable, permanent approved improvements on the cottage sites. These 
improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use. 
21. On March 16,2010, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for 
the new term from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the 1.5% increase phased 
in over a 5-year period. 
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Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases 
22. In early 2010, Plaintiffs informed the Land Board, in writing, of their intent to 
exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional 
10 year period, effective January 1,2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same terms 
set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but 
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less. 
23. On March 12, 15, 16 and 17,2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a fonn 
letter which was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received 
Plaintiffs' notices renewlng their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new 
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs' 
notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenus. 
The Department informed Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their 
leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board 
in March 2010. 
24. Thereafter, on or about March 31, 2010, the Department of Lands mailed 
Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the 
4% rental rate fonnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting. The letter 
advised Plaintiffs that they bad until April 30 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00 
nonrefundable application fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board 
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that 
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue 
the existing lease tenus. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused 
renewal of the eXlsting lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms. 
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25. Plaintiffs thereafter again gave written notice of their intent to renew. In 
exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made 
clear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to 
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made 
on the basis of the existing lease terms. 
26. As of the filing of this Complaint neither the Department of Lands nor the Land 
Board have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage 
site leases. 
27. Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of 
Lands. dated March 31. 20 I 0, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the 
renewal leases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases, 
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value. 
IV. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT I - Breach of Contract/Specific Performance 
(Relating to Existing Cottage Site Leases) 
28. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
29. Plaintiffs entered into a valid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage 
sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a 1 O-year period, with a right to renew under the 
same lease terms, including the same rental rate. 
30. Plaintiffs, with the approval of the Land Board andlor Department of Lands, 
constructed andlor maintained valuable improvements On their leaseholds. 
31. Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to 
renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease teons and by statute. 
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32. The Land Board has breached the tenns of the contract by refusing to recognize 
Plaintiffs' right to renew the lease contract under the same terms, including the same rental rate. 
33. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract. 
34. Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach 
are inadequate due to the unique nature of the real property at issue. 
35. Plaintiffs therefore seek specific performance of the existing cottage site leases, 
including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of 
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period(s) under the terms present in the existing 
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate. 
COUNT II - Breach of Contract 
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase of Cottage Site Improvements) 
36. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
37. The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plaintiffs apply to renew their 
leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the 
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of 
the improvements. 
38. The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing terms, 
including the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land 
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their 
respective lots. 
39. The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it intends to 
purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby 
breaching the terms of its lease with Plaintiffs. 
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40. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board. 
41. Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and 
either: (a) obtain specific performance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b) 
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on 
their respective leaseholds. 
COUNT III - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of the Idaho Constitution) 
42. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
43. The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4% 
of property value does not secure the maximum long-tenn financial return to the grantees of the 
cottage sites andlor the state. 
44. By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess 
of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-term 
financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from 
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate formula. 
45. Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are 
interested andlor atfected parties under Idaho's Uniform Declaratory 1udgment Act, codified at 
I.e. §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217. 
46. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16, 20 I 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the 
[daho Constitution. 
11 
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COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding the Land Board's Violation off.C. § 58-310A) 
47. Plaintiffs incorporate aU previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
48. The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for 
the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent. 
49. By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the 
Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites. 
50. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16,20] 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.C. § 58-31 OA. 
COUNT V - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding the Land Board's Unconstitutional Application on.c. § 58-310A) 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
52. The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage 
sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by I.e. § 58-31 OA. 
53. The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property 
value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the 
state. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16, 
2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Anicle IX, Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 58-31 OA. 
COUNT VI - Injunctive Relief 
55. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
56. Plaintiffs will suffer great andJor irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is 
allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew 
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their leases on the existing lease tenns, or will lose their valuable improvements without 
receiving fair and just compensation. 
57. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the 
Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing 
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms. 
VII. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
58. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & 
Blanton, P,A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney 
fees and costs relative to their prosecution ofthis action. 
59. Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements 
and Idaho Code § 12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. and any other contractual provision, 
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows: 
I. For a declaratory judgment that the March 16,2010 decision of the Land Board is 
unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.e. § 58-31OA andlor in violation of I.e. § 
58·310A; 
2. For an Order enjoining the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands from 
including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in 
Plaintiffs' existing leases; 
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3. For an Order directing the Land Board and/or the Department of Lands to provide 
Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same tenns as Plaintiffs' 
existlng leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained 
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites; 
4. That, in the event the Court detennines the Land Board is entitled to impose a 
new rental rate fonnula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the 
opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate fonnula 
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 2010 letter; 
5. That in the alternative, Plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be 
determined; 
6. That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action; 
7. That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is 
decided by default~ and 
8. All other relief which the Court deems just and equitable. 
DA TED this ££.y of October, 20 l O. 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
ISB #1904, pso@haJlfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\4\4-682.1 \PlEADlNGS\Complllint • Amended.do<: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Case NO. ___ ir.'l1. No. __ _ 
Filed AM. 3: ~e P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY; 
BARBARA 1. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH. as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY 
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRUST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and 
MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BENNETT O. DA Y and DONNA DAY 
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 1 
MARJORIE DA Y TRUST~ DA VlD THATCHER! 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHAR.J\1E REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH 1 FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOW ARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA I 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT: 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRICKSON, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HlLLJARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the ESTATE OF 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY F AMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEA?\"N 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN. 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGCSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. P1STEY, as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KA TY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RlDDLE~ SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DA VrD ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
F AMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CY"l':DY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. ! 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH I 
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the 
S~ITH F AMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIA1\"; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP I 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; 
SUZA::-.lNE ZIMMERMAt'J; LINDA S. TURNER; 
GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, I 
Plaintiffs, I 
VS. j 
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISS]O~ERS; 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the above-named plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall, 
Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A, and for good cause against the above-named defendants, 
complain and allege as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County, 
Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant. Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"), 
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land 
Board and promises made to the Land Board. The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and 
remedies with respect to the parcels of real property. 
2. The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of 
the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's 
public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. 
3. Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands 
("Department of Lands"). The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho, 
established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 58~ 121, 
Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties. countersigning leases issued by the president 
of the Land Board for rental of state endowment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state 
nonnal schools and the state hospital. 
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II. 
JURISDICTION and VENUE 
4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they all either reSlde in 
or do business in the state of Idaho. 
5. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court, 
6. The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County, 
[daho. 
7. Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401. 
III. 
FACTS 
The Land Board's Constitutional and Statutory Direction 
8. Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide 
for the rental of all state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such 
manner as will secure the maximum long.term financial return to the institution to which 
granted, or to the state if not specifically granted. 
9. Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state 
land at a rental amount fixed and detennined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307, 
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to 
thirty-five (35) years. 
10. The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real 
property which is leased for recreational residential purposes. Plaintiffs' leases all concerned 
cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases." 
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11. Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be 
applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances, 
Idaho Code § 58-3] 0 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to 
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore, with the annual rent to be established 
by the Land Board. However, Idaho Code § 58-310A provides that the conflict auction and 
application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead, 
Idaho Code § 58-310A directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot 
generates market rent throughout the duratjon of the lease. 
The Terms of the Currently Existing Cottage Sjte Leases 
12. The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state 
lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on 
January I, 2001. The existing leases will terminate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board 
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site. 
13. The lease provjdes for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the 
leased premises, as determined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation 
is determined by the assessor. The rent is payabJe on or before January 1 of each year, and is 
paid one year in advance. Rent may increase Or decrease effective January I of any calendar 
year, in accordance with the 2.5% formula. 
14. For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites 
are valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on 
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will 
rely on lot values as established by the Valley County Assessor. 
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15. The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold 
approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal. 
16. If a request to renew is denied, the lease provides the Land Board will pay 
the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed on the leased 
premises. The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the 
improvements on the lease's expiration date. 
17. In the event of an expiration or tennination of the lease for any reason 
other than default by the lessee, and in the event I.and Board leases the land to a new 
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board 
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or 
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to 
the prior lessee. 
t 8. The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently 
enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the 
lease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and 
laws of the state of Jdaho or other governmental entities. 
19. The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application 
and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58-310. 
20. Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs 
would be given a right to renew the leases on their current tenns, and that Plaintiffs 
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed 
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or 
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maintain vaJuabJe, permanent approved improvements on the cottage sites. These 
improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use. 
21. On March 16,20]0, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for 
the new tenn from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the 1.5% increase phased 
in over a 5-year period. 
Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases 
22. In early 2010, Plaintiffs informed the Land Board, in wTiting, of their intent to 
exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional 
10 year period, effective January 1, 2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same tenns 
set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but 
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less. 
23. On March 12, 15, 16 and 17,2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a fonn 
Jetter whicn was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received 
Plaintiffs' notices renewing their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new 
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs' 
notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenns. 
The Department informed Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their 
leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board 
in March 2010. 
24. Thereafter, on or about March 31,2010, the Department of Lands mailed 
Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the 
4% rental rate fonnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 20 10 meeting. The letter 
advised Plaintiffs that they had until April )0 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00 
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nonrefundab1e appJication fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board 
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that 
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue 
the existing lease terms. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused 
renewal of the existing lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms. 
25. Plaintiffs thereafter again gave ~'Titten notice of their intent to renew. In 
exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made 
clear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to 
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made 
on the basis of the existing lease terms. 
26. As of the filing of this Complaint, neither the Department of Lands nor the Land 
Board have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage 
site leases. 
27. Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of 
Lands, dated March 31, 2010, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the 
renewal [eases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases, 
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value. 
III/ 
II/I 
II/I 
1//1 
1111 
I1I1 
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IV. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT I - Breach of Contract/Specific Performance 
(Relating to Existing Cottage Site Leases) 
28. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
29. Plaintiffs entered into a valid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage 
sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a lO-year period, with a right to renew under the 
same lease tenos, including the same rental rate. 
30. Plaintiffs, with the approval of the Land Board andlor Department of Lands, 
constructed andlor maintained valuable improvements on their leaseholds. 
31. Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to 
renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease terms and by statute. 
32. The Land Board has breached the terms of the contract by refusing to recognize 
Plaintiffs' right to renew lhe lease contract under the same tenns, including the same rental rate. 
33. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract. 
34. Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach 
are inadequate due to the unique nature of the real property at issue. 
35. Plaintiffs therefore seek specific performance of the existing cottage site leases, 
including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of 
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period{s) under the terms present in the existing 
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate. 
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COUNT II - Breach of Contract 
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase of Cottage Site Improvements} 
36. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
37. The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plaintiffs apply to renew their 
leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the 
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of 
the improvements. 
38. The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing terms, 
induding the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land 
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their 
respective lots. 
39. The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it intends to 
purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby 
breaching the terms of its lease with Plaintiffs. 
40. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board. 
4 i . Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and 
either: (a) obtain specific performance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b) 
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on 
their respective leaseholds. 
III1 
/1// 
ill! 
II1I 
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COUNT [II - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding the Land Board's Violation of the Idaho Constitution) 
42. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
43. The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4% 
of property value does not secure the maximum long-term financial return to the grantees of the 
cottage sites and/or the state. 
44. By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess 
of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-term 
financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from 
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate formula. 
45. Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are 
interested and/or affected parties under [daho's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at 
I.e. §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217. 
46. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX. Section 8 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of I.e. § S8-31OA) 
47. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
48. The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for 
the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent. 
49. By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the 
Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT - 12 
26 
50. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16, 20 I 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.e. § 58-31 OA. 
COUNT V - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Unconstitutional Application on.c. § 58-310Al 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
52. The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage 
sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by l.c. § 58-31 OA. 
53. The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property 
value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the 
state. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16, 
2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the [daho 
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of LC. § 58-31 OA. 
COUNT VI- Injunctive Relief 
55. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
56. Plaintiffs will suffer great andlor irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is 
allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew 
their leases on the existing lease terms, or will lose their valuable improvements without 
receiving fair and just compensation. 
57. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the 
Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing 
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms. 
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VII. 
CLAIM FOR A TTOR;.~EY FEES AND COSTS 
58. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & 
Blanton, P.A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney 
fees and costs relative to their prosecution of this action. 
59. Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements 
and fdaho Code § 12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other contractual provision, 
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action. 
PRA YER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows: 
]. For a declaratory judgment that the March 16,2010 decision of the Land Board is 
unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 58-3 lOA and/or in violation of I.e. § 
58-310A; 
2. For an Order enjoining the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands from 
including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in 
Plajntiffs' existing leases; 
3. For an Order directing the Land Board and/or the Department of Lands to provide 
Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same terms as Plaintiffs' 
existing leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained 
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites; 
4. That, in the event the Court determines the Land Board is entitled to impose a 
new rental rate formula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the 
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opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate formula 
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 2010 letter; 
5. That in the alternative. Plaintiffs be awarded damages m an amount to be 
de tenni ned; 
6. That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action; 
7. That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is 
decided by default; and 
8. AU other relief which the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this l day of Nov ember, 2010. 
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
l'tt"j .. i· U 
By: \~W-¥.--\~}-'--':,-r:';.-..-=-===-----­
Phillip S. Oberrecht -X>fthe Firm 
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB No. 3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
CLA YR. SMITH, ISS. No. 6385 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his 
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. 
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND 
BENEFICIARlES, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
STATE BOARD OF LAND 
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, 
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho 
Department of Lands 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
cv 0 C 1 0 2 3 75 1'. 
No. ____ --'-
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
I. (a) Plaintiff Lawrence G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of 
Idaho, brings this action on behalf of beneficiaries of the income generated from the 
management of endowment lands located at or near Payette and Priest Lakes and commonly 
referred to as the "cottage sites." Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution imposes upon 
Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board") responsibility for "the direction, 
control and disposition of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may be 
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prescribed by law." Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution imposes upon the Land 
Board the duty "to provide for the location, prote'ction, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, 
or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, 
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the 
maximum long term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if not 
specifically granted," and imposes upon the Idaho Legislature the duty, inter alia, to "provide by 
law that the general grants of land made by congress shall be judiciously located and carefully 
preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the 
respective object for which said grants were made." 
(b) The Legislature purported to discharge its duty under Article IX, Section 
8 with respect to the leasing of the cottage sites through passage of 1990 Idaho Session Laws 
chapter 187, now codified at Idaho Code § 58-31OA (" 1990 Act"). In summary, the 1990 Act 
removed the cottage sites from the "conflict auction" requirements in Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and 
-310 that had applied, with several amendments, since 1905 (1905 Idaho Sess. L. 131,137,138-
39 (House Bill No. 130, §§ 15, \8)). and directed the Land Board instead to "insure that each 
leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease." 
(c) The Land Board has purported to fulfill its statutory duty unde~IOA' 
and its constitutional obligation to secure maximum long term financial returns, by establishing 
rental rates that unlawfully elevate the interests of lessees above the interests of the beneficiaries 
and, by the admission ofa majority of Land Board members, do not obtain market rent. 
(d) Plaintiff seeks a determination that the Legislature's exemption of cottage 
sites from the public auction requirement in Article IX, Section 9 is void on its face and that the 
Land Board is acting outside its authority in establishing rents that do not fulfill its constitutional 
and statutory obligations to endowment beneficiaries. Declaratory relief so determining should 
issue, together with preliminary and permanent injunctions that restrain the Land Board and 
Defendant George Bacon from giving prospective effect to Idaho Code § 58-31 OA. 
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(e) Plaintiff further seeks a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease 
rates established by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting violate its constitutional duty 
to "secure the maximum long-term financial return" of the affected endowment land 
beneficiaries. In the event the Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58-310A is constitutional, 
Plaintive seeks alternatively a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease rates to be 
implemented in the next lease term violate the statutory mandate to secure market rent 
throughout the duration of the lease. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES 
2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho Code § 1-705.1. Venue in 
this Court exists under Idaho Code § 5-402.2 because the actions and/or conduct giving rise to 
this controversy arose in the City of Boise, County of Ada. 
3. Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the State of ldaho. The Attorney General of 
Idaho is an office established by Article IV, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. The Attorney 
General is required by Idaho Code § 58-120 to represent the State ofIdaho "in all suits, actions, 
contests or controversies relating to or involving state lands." The Attorney General has 
authority under the common law and under Idaho Code § 67-140](5), to "supervise ... persons 
holding property subject to any public or charitable trust and to enforce whenever necessary any 
noncompliance or departure from the general purpose of such trust" and to "institute, in the name 
of the state, any proceeding necessary to enforce compliance with the terms of the trust or any 
departure therefrom." The Attorney General brings this action on behalf of entities to whose 
benefit income from cottage site leases accrue, which include Idaho public school districts, Idaho 
normal schools, the Idaho state hospital, and such entities' students and patients. 
4. Defendant Land Board is established under Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho 
Constitution and consists of five statewide-elected Idaho officers: Governor, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Controller. See also Idaho 
Code § 53-10 1. 
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5. The Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL") is the executive agency established to 
administer state endowment lands. Idaho Code §§ 58-10 1 and -119. Defendant George Bacon is 
the IDL Director. Defendant Bacon's duties and responsibilities include preparing endowment 
land leases for Land Board consideration and countersigning such leases with the Land Board 
president, including leases for the cottage sites. Idaho Code § 58-121. 
B. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
6. Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution is entitled "State Board of Land 
Commissioners" and provides: "The governor, superintendent of public instruction, secretary of 
state, attorney general and state controller shall constitute the state board of land commissioners, 
who shall have the direction, control and disposition of the public lands of the state. under such 
regulations as may be prescribed by law." See also Idaho Code § 58-101. 
7. Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution is entitled "Location and 
disposition of public lands" and provides: 
It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location, 
protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted 
to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, under such regulations as 
may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum long term 
financia1 return to the institution to which granted or to the state jf not specifically 
granted; provided, that no state lands shaH be sold for less than the appraised price. No 
law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to persons who may 
have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the general 
government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such 
lands. shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest 
practicable period. provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to 
the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to 
disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said 
grants of land were made, and the legislature shall provide for the sale of said lands 
from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful 
application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants; 
provided, that not to exceed one hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone 
year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed three hundred and twenty acres of 
land to anyone individual, company or corporation. The legislature shall have power to 
authorize the state board of land commissioners to exchange granted or acquired lands 
of the state on an equa1 value basis for other lands under agreement with the United 
States, local units of government, corporations. companies. individuals, or combinations 
thereof. 
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See also Idaho Code § 58-119(3) (referring to lands held in trust)~ § 58-133 (same)~ § 58-136 
(same); and § 58-156(3) (declaring that "the endo\\-ment lands are held in trust by the state board 
of land commissioners and are managed to generate the maximum long-term financial returns to 
the public school endowment"). 
8. Section 58-310A, Idaho Code, is entitled "Legislative findings and purposes-
Leases of single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites not subject to conflict 
application and auction provisions" and provides: 
(I) The legislature of the state of Idaho finds: 
(a) That from time to time single family, recreational cottage site and homesite 
leases have been the target of conflict applications to lease said premises and 
property; 
(b) That single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites have typically 
been held by the same family, sometimes for as long as fifty (50) years; 
(c) That conflict applications for a lease require the state board of land 
commissioners to hold an auction between the applicants and award the lease to 
the highest bidder; 
(d) That existing statutes allow the board no discretion in rejecting applications, 
and only limited discretion in rejecting bids, notably for collusion or similar 
irregularities in the bidding process; 
(e) That, in the case of single family, recreational cottage site and homesite 
leases, the conflict application and auction procedure have caused considerable 
consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the prospect of losing a long-
time lease; 
(f) That, although conflict applications have been filed from time to time, the 
board has never held a contlict auction or realized any direct revenue from such 
appl ications; 
(g) That section 8, article IX, of the constitution of the state of Idaho provides 
that the board manage state endowment lands in such manner as will secure the 
maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the 
state if not specifically granted; 
(h) That maximum long-term financial returns to the institutions to which 
granted are best obtained through stable leases at market rent. 
(2) It is hereby declared that leases for single family, recreational cottage sites and 
homesites shall not be subject to the conflict application and auction provisions of 
sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code. The board shall reject any and all pending and 
future contlict applications tiled under sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code, for 
single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases. 
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(3) In the absence of the contlict application and auction procedure in the single family, 
recreational cottage site and homesite lease, and lease renewal process, the board shall 
insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease. 
C. HISTORY OF THE COTTAGE SITES' LEASING PROGRAM 
9. The Land Board currently leases 355 recreational home sites on Priest Lake and 
167 recreational home sites on Payette Lake. The recreational home sites have traditionally been 
referred to as "cottage sites." The 355 cottage sites at Priest Lake are located on public school 
lands. Of the 167 cottage sites at Payette Lake, two are located on public school lands, 56 on 
normal school lands, and 109 on state hospital lands. The majority of the cottage sites were first 
leased in the mid-1940s and early- t 950s, though some date back to as early as 1924. Each 
cottage site lot is owned in fee simple by the State of Idaho as trustee for public schools, normal 
schools (Idaho State University, Department of Education, and Lewis-Clark State College), and 
the state hospital. The improvements on the cottage site lots are owned by the lessees. 
10. Until 1990, expiring cottage site leases were "subject to disposal at public 
auction" pursuant to the provisions of Article IX, Section 8 and Idaho Code § 58-3] 0, the latter 
of which prescribes procedures for "conflict auctions." The Land Board followed practices-
such as advertising public auctions by posting notices of availability only on the local court 
house bulletin board rather than advertising them as they did on other expiring leases-that 
discouraged conflict auctions. Consequently, prior to 1990, few applications for conflict 
auctions were received and none had proceeded to auction. In lieu of establishing market rents 
by public auction, the Land Board used flat rental rates until 1986, when IOL estimated that the 
state was receiving a return on assets value of only 0.67 per cent for all cottage site leases. 
Thereafter, the Land Board adopted a rental rate of 2.5% of the value of the cottage site, to be 
phased in over a period of years. 
11. As an adjunct to annual rent, the Land Board, starting in /981, imposed what it 
described as "premium rent." Premium rent is not rent at all; rather, it refers to the requirement 
that lessees pay 10% of the leasehold value upon assignment or transfer of the lease to someone 
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outside the lessee's immediate family. Leasehold value is determined by subtracting the value of 
the improvements and the personal property from the total sale price. IDAPA 20.03.13.25. 
Board members, IDL staff, and outside consultants have repeatedly stated that the large 
leasehold values upon which premium rent is based would not accrue if annual rents were set at 
market rates. Premium rent was adopted so that when lessees assigned leaseholds for value, "the 
State could share in the profit" that lessees enjoy when assigning leases for value. By rule, 
premium rent was to expire "December 31, 1992 or until contract rents have been increased to 
full market rents, whichever comes first." IDAPA 20.03.13.27. Although the premium rent rule 
expired in 1992, the Board, in recognition of the fact that annual rents remained well below fair 
market value, has continued to impose the premium rent requirement as a matter of policy and 
contract. 
12. By 1990 demand for cottage site leases had increased significantly, so that buyers 
were willing to pay substantial amounts of money to purchase leaseholds from existing lessees. 
Two pending applications for conflict auction prompted the Land Board to delay the applications 
so that the Legislature could address existing lessees' concerns over application of the conflict-
auction process. 
D. ELIMINATION OF PUBLIC AUCTION REQUIREMENT 
13. In written testimony submitted to the Legislature in 1990, cottage site lessees 
asserted that conflict auctions were unfair because all conflict-auction proceeds belong to the 
State and argued that they would lose the substantial amounts of money paid to predecessor 
lessees for the right to assume the lease. The Legislature, expressing concern over, inter alia, the 
fact "the contlict application and auction procedure have caused considerable consternation and 
dismay to the existing lessees at the prospect of losing a long-time lease" (Idaho Code § 58-
310A(l)(e)), abolished the use of public auctions as a means of establishing market rents and 
established a general requirement that the Board "ensure that each lot generates market rent 
throughout the duration of the lease" (id. § 58-310A(3»). 
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14. Imposition on the Land Board of the duty to determine the appropriate "market 
rate" requirement resulted directly from removing the public auction requirement. The term 
"market rate, If according to an economic analysis prepared for the Land Board in 2008, refers to 
"the most probable rent that a property should bring in a competitive and open market reflecting 
all conditions and restrictions of the specified lease agreement including term, rental adjustments 
and reevaluation, permitted uses, use restrictions, and expense obligations." Consequently, 
"[w]hen contract rent equals market rent, the leasedfee estate is nearly equivalent in value to the 
fee simple estate because if the property were to become vacant, the lessor could likely find 
another tenant who would pay approximately the same rent." 
15. No cottage site has been leased following a public auction during the period since 
the 1990 Act became effective on March 29, 1990 because all lease transfers have been affected 
through sale and assignment by the then-existing lessee to the new lessee. See Idaho Admin. R. 
20.03.13.020. 
E. LAND BOARD IMPLEMENT A TION OF IDAHO CODE § 58-3 lOA 
] 6. The passage ofIdaho Code § 58-31OA prompted the Board to reexamine its rental 
policies to comply with the new statutory requirement to obtain market rent. Real Estate 
Consultants recommended a variable rate of return tied to lot values, with rates of 4.5% to 5.5%; 
but the Land Board not only continued the then-present Board policy of phasing in a 2.5% rental 
rate, it further restricted the phase-in rate to 5.3% annually, despite being advised by IDL staff 
that a phase-in rate of 5.3% annually would not achieve the target of 2.5% of land value 
"because land values-and target rentals-are rising faster than 5.3% annually." 
17. By 1997, the disparity between the rapid rise in market value and the 5.3% annual 
cap on rent increases had reduced the actual rate of return to 1%. IDL staff recommended that 
rents be raised over a five year period to achieve a return of 5% of property value. The Land 
Board, after hearing the concerns of lessees, once again rejected staff recommendations to raise 
the rent and instead affirmed the 2.5% rental rate "with the understanding that it can be reopened 
based on incoming information." 
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] 8. Outside experts subsequently were again consulted, and again such experts 
recommended substantial rental increases to at least 3.5% of property value for Priest Lake 
cottage sites and at least 4% of property value for Payette Lake cottage sites. Once again, both 
the outside experts and rDL staff emphasized that the presence of large leasehold values was 
clear evidence that contract rents were below market rents. Nonetheless, the Land Board again 
adopted a rental rate of 2.5% with the justification that such a rate "recognizes and takes into 
consideration the lessees sweat equity and site improvements." 
] 9. The annual rental rate has remained ostensibly at 2.5% Slfice ] 998, but real 
returns have at times fallen below 2.5% due to freezes on valuation of cottage sites in the face of 
rapidly rising land values. In recent years leasehold values, and profits enjoyed by lessees upon 
assignment of leases, have continued to increase, thus demonstrating the Land Board's failure to 
obtain market rent. Since 2003. cottage site owners have realized in excess of $25 million from 
the sale of leaseholds. Over four of the last seven years, the amount of money received by 
lessees for the conveyance of leaseholds exceeded the total rent received by the Board on behalf 
of endowment beneficiaries. For example, in 2006, nine lessees received $6,482,709 for the 
conveyance of leaseholds. That same year, the total amount of annual and premium rent 
received by the Board for all 522 cottage sites was $4,022,676. 
F. 2007 COTTAGE SITE RENTAL FOR\1ULA SUBCOMMITTEE 
20. (a) In 2007, the Board appointed two Board members - Secretary of State 
Ben Ysursa and Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna - to form a subcommittee to 
recommend a rental formula to be applied to the cottage sites during the lease term that starts 
January I, 20 II. Over the next several years, the subcommittee held a series of meetings with 
lessees to hear their concerns and to evaluate alternative methods of calculating rents. The 
members of the subcommittee expressed the desire to work on a "collaborative basis" with the 
lessees to establish a mutually-agreeable rent. Board member Luna described the 
subcommittee's mission as an opportunity "to meet our obligation on the Land Board to bring 
some stability ... to these cottage site leases, and, you know, for those who own the leases." 
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Board member Ysursa stated he was "very sympathetic to the plight of the cottage site owners as 
far as predictability and stability as far as these rapid escalation of rents." 
(b) When the Board met on February \6, 2010 to detennine rental rates for 
2011, the subcommittee presented a report with the following recommendation: "[A J target 
annual lease rent ('target rent') will be calculated at 4.0% of the average appraised value of each 
lot over the most recent 10 years (the sum of the 10 prior years appraised or indexed values for 
each lot divided by to). Actual rent will increase or decrease annually from the prior year's rent 
at a constant percentage rate to reach the target rent in year five. Every five years from the 
efTective date of the lease, the actual rent will be recalculated using this same methodology and 
appraised values of the lot for the most recent 10 years. Lot values shall be appraised by the 
applicable county assessor or detennined by an Idaho Certified Appraiser, at the discretion of the 
Department. At the end of the (sic) each five year period under the lease, the target rent will be 
calculated at 4.0% of the average value for the duration of the lease." 
(c) The subcommittee's rationale for its recommendations was that "severely 
impairing or eroding longstanding business relationships with our lessees is not in the best 
interest of our trust beneficiaries" and the fact that fluctuations in rent "cause[J concern for cabin 
site lessees." The subcommittee report expressed the concern that "raising rents too high would 
result in these lands going unleased, to the detriment of beneficiaries." In presenting the 
subcommittee report to the Board, however, subcommittee member Ysursa described the process 
as "balancing our constitutional mandate in article 9, section 8, prudent investor standards, 
whatever you want to say, with the long-tenn relationship we have with the lessees." 
G. RESPONSE TO AND BOARD ACTION ON SUBCOMMITTEE'S REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
21. The subcommittee's report and recommendations were addressed by both IDL 
staff and outside consultants retained by the Attorney General in his capacity as a Land Board 
member. 
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(a) roL Director George Bacon concluded that while the target rate would be 
4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would vary 
between 2.37% and 2.43% ifland appreciated at 4.8% annually. If land were to appreciate at an 
annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further 
concluded: HI do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased lot 
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease. but neither does the current system." 
Director Bacon also examined recent leasehold sales, which indicated that the contract rate of 
2.5% of current assessed or appraised value that was in effect in recent years was below market 
value. In 2008 and 2009, two "down" years in the real estate market, 2] leaseholds sold for 
$6,392,039, an average of over $300,000 per leasehold. Director Bacon stated: "[bJased on the 
numerous studies previously commissioned and conducted by real estate experts, it appears as 
long as there is leasehold value, the rent charged is not at market." 
(b) In 2010, Attorney General Wasden commissioned two economists to 
independently examine the issue of market rent generally and to determine whether the 
subcommittee recommendation would achieve market rent and fulfill the Board's duty to 
maximize the long term financial return for endowment beneficiaries. The economists 
concluded that the subcommittee recommendation would not fulfill the Board's duty to 
maximize the long term financial return for the endowment beneficiaries. They found 
particularly troubling the subcommittee's proposal to "smooth" rent increases by using both a ten 
year rolling average to establish lot values and a five year phase-in to reach the rent based on 
such ten-year average value, since it "guarantees that the state is not securing market rent for the 
five year adjustment period." The economists also concluded that the proposal to gradually 
increase premium rent until it reaches 50% of leasehold value "validates that the board has not 
been charging market rents, that below market rents have contributed to leasehold values, and 
that the state has been missing out on revenues that a prudent investor would have captured." In 
response to questioning from a Board member at its meeting on February 16, 2010, one of the 
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economists emphasized that the combination of rolling average and phased-in target rent would 
"hamstring the Board in meeting its fiduciary responsibility" to obtain market rent. 
22. Three of the five Board members have explicitly acknowledged on the record that 
the rents to be imposed over the next ten-year rental term are below the market rental rate. Two 
of those Board members voted in opposition to the rental scheme. One Board member, despite 
conceding that the 4% rental rate, when combined with the subcommittee's recommended 
"smoothing effect" resulted in rents "quite a ways away from market rent," nonetheless voted in 
favor of such rent. Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the Land Board voted 3-2 at its 
March 16, 2010 meeting to adopt the phased-in annual rental rate and a modified premium rent 
consisting of the greater of 10% of gross leasehold value or 50% of net leasehold value. 
H. FAILURE TO SECURE CONSTITUTIONALLY AND/OR STATUTORILY 
REQUIRED FINANCIAL RETURNS 
23. [n sum, despite unequivocal evidence from leasehold sales and other indicators 
that contract rents are below market rate, the Land Board continues to ignore its constitutionally-
imposed obligation to trust beneficiaries to secure maximum long term financial returns. The 
leases that will be distributed to cottage site lessees for the ten year lease term beginning January 
I, 20 I], adopt a nominal target rate of 4% of property value, but such rate is to be phased in over 
a five year period, and the property value upon which the rate is based is not current market 
value, but the average market value for the years 2001 through 2010. After five years the cycle 
is repeated, with rent to be based on average property values from 2005-20 IS, to be phased in 
over five years. As a result, IDL Director George Bacon concluded that while the target rate 
would be 4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would 
vary between 2.37% and 2.43% if land appreciated at 4.8% annually. If land were to appreciate 
at an annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further 
concluded: "1 do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased lot 
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease, but neither does the current system." 
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24. The Land Board also continues to impose premium rent, widely acknowledged as 
an implicit admission that leasehold values will continue to accrue because contract rent is below 
market rent. For the next rental term, the trusts' beneficiaries will not receive the money they 
would receive if the Board were getting market rent for the leases, as constitutionally and 
statutorily required. Members of the Board have acknowledged that the rents imposed by the 
Board are not based solely on their duty to maximize income for trust beneficiaries, but rather 
are the result of their desire to work on a "collaborative basis" with the lessees to establish a 
mutually-agreeable rent and their desire to "bring some stability ... to these cottage site leases, 
and, you know, for those who own the leases." One Board member stated he was "very 
sympathetic to the plight of the cottage site owners as far as predictability and stability as far as 
these rapid escalation of rents," and described the process as "balancing our constitutional 
mandate in article 9, section 8, prudent investor standards, whatever you want to say, with the 
long-term relationship we have with the lessees." 
I. CURRENT COTTAGE LEASE STATUS 
25. Under its cottage-site leasing practices, the Land Board, acting through the JDL, 
issued ten-year leases to renewing lessees for the periods of 1992-2000 and 200] -2010. It has 
directed Defendant Bacon to prepare ten-year leases for execution by those existing lessees 
desiring to renew for the 2011-2020 period, but such leases have not been executed by Defendant 
Bacon or co-signed by the Land Board's president. The period for making application for 
renewal leases has expired, and, as of the date of this Complaint, many, if not all, of the existing 
lessees have submitted timely and otherwise valid applications to IDL. Upon the Attorney 
General's information and belief, Defendant Bacon will forward the renewal leases to existing 
lessees on or before December 6, 2010. 
I. IDAHO SUPREME COURT OPINION 
26. On December 1,2010, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wasden ex 
reI. State v. Idaho Stale Board of Land Commissioners, No. 37528 (Idaho S. Ct.), dismissing a 
petition for wTit of prohibition tiled by Attorney General Wasden and directed exclusively to the 
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Land Board's noncompliance with the "maximum long-term financial return" requirement in 
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land 
Comm'rs, 2010 Idaho No. ]28,2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1,2010). The basis for the dismissal 
was the availability of a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law-i.e., injunctive relief under 
I.R.C.P. 65. The Court nevertheless discussed various background facts and stated in part: 
(a) "As leasehold values grew it became clear to the Board that it was not 
achieving market rent, and in 1981 the Board invented the concept of 'premium rent' to try to 
decrease the amount of profit the Lessees were reaping from the gap between actual and market 
rent. The term 'premium rent' is a misnomer; it would be more accurate to refer to this 
mechanism as a 'leasehold transfer fee.' Premium rent requires that the lessee pay the State a 
certain percentage of the value that the lessee receives from selling his leasehold interest in a 
cottage site. In 1981 this percentage was set at 10%. So, for example, if a lessee sold his 
leasehold for $160,000 and had placed $60,000 of improvements and personal property on the 
land, the leasehold value would be $ 100,000. Of that $100,000 the State would be entitled to 
$10,000 and the remaining $90,000 would go to the selling lessee. Premium rent was conceived 
of as a temporary measure, the utility and impact of which would disappear as rents reached fair 
market value. In fact the IDAPA provision establishing premium rent~IDAPA 20.03.13.027-
reproduced above, expired on December 31, 1992. Nevertheless the Board and IDL have 
contjnued to apply premium rent to leasehold sales." 2010 WL 4861713, at *3 (footnote 
omitted). 
(b) "From 1905 until 1991 the cottage sites were subject to conflict auctions 
pursuant to I.e. § 58-310, and its statutory predecessors. Idaho Code § 58-310 provides that, 
when a lease term expires and more than one party makes application to lease the property, an 
auction is held amongst the applying parties to determine which is willing to pay the most to 
lease the property. Despite having been subject to this provision, no conflict auction had been 
carried out on a cottage site until 1990. It is likely that this apparent lack of interest was 
attributable to lack of public awareness, largely due to the fact that the Board had a policy 
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against advertising when cottage leases were expiring, and posted notices of availability only on 
the local court house bulletin board. In 1990 the Board received conflicting applications for two 
different cottage sites, where both the existing lessees and an outside party applied to lease. 
Instead of holding a contlict auction as I.e. § 58-310 required, IDL requested that the legislature 
draft legislation exempting cottage sites from I.C. § 58-310. As a result, I.C. § 58-310A was 
passed, eliminating conflict auctions as a means of establishing the maximum long-term 
financial return and instead requiring that the Board ensure that the cottage leases generate 
market rent throughout their duration." Id. 
(c) "By 1997, leasehold values had escalated sharply and for some cottage 
sites the local property taxes actually exceeded the rent IDL was collecting from the Lessees. 
The escalating property value, coupled with the 5.3% cap on rent increases from year-to-year, 
meant that the return on the cottage sites was only slightly higher than it had been in 1986, at 
1%. IDL concluded that it was quite apparent thllt the rent being collected under the cottage 
leases was below market rent. IDL concluded that all available market data suggested that 
market rent would be somewhere between 3% and 5%, noting that most data supported a 5% 
rate. IDL concluded that the Board would not be complying with its constitutional duty if it 
continued with its existing rental formula. The Board nonetheless voted to continue the 2.5% 
rate, though it did create a new target rent based on the most recent property assessment-to be 
updated on an annual basis-eliminated the phase-in period, and removed the yearly cap on rent 
increases." 2010 WL 4861713, at "'4 (footnotes omitted). 
(d) "The [2007] Cottage Site Subcommittee recommended a new lease 
structure with annual rent set at 4% of average market value of each cottage site over the 
previous 10 years, to be updated annually (the so-called 'rolling average'). However, the 4% 
rolling average would not be reached until the. en,dof a 5-year phase-in period during which rent 
would be incrementally increased from its current level to the target rent. The new cottage leases 
would also include premium rent, though under a more complicated formula than that previously 
employed. The Cottage Site Subcommittee recommended that 'premium rent be calculated at 
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10% of the gross leasehold value or 50% of the net leasehold value, whichever is the greater 
amount for the endowment.' The Cottage Site Subcommittee explained that '[ n]et leasehold 
value shall be calculated by subtracting the original leasehold value (sales price less the value of 
tenant improvements) of the lessee who is transferring the lease from the leasehold value (sale 
price less the value of tenant improvements) when a transfer occurs.' It was clarified during a 
regular Board meeting that the Cottage Site Subcommittee was recommending the 50% net 
leasehold premium rent be phased in over a period of 5 years." 2010 WL 4861713, at *5. 
(e) "The Director of lDL analyzed the Cottage Site Subcommittee 
recommendations and determined that the rolling average system of determining rental rates 
would result in actual return being approximately 2.4% assuming land value appreciates at 4.8% 
a year, or 1.5% if land appreciates at 10.3% annually. The Director concluded '1 do not believe 
the Subcommittee's recommendation ensures that each leased lot generates market rent 
throughout the duration of the lease, but neither does the current system.' On March 16, 20 10, 
the Board voted 3-2 for the new lease structure as recommended by the Cottage Site 
Subcommittee." Jd. 
(t) "The determination of 'market rent' is fundamental1y a factual 
determination although the statements of three-fifths of the membership of the Land Board do 
indicate that the leases in question do not achieve the level of market rent." 20 I 0 WL 4861713, 
at *8. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
27. The allegations in paragraphs] through 26 above are incorporated by reference. 
28. Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution requires, in relevant part, the 
Legislature, "at the earliest practicable period, [to] provide by law that the general grants ofland 
made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in 
trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for 
which said grants of land were made." The State acquired the cottage sites pursuant to such a 
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"general grant[] of land" from Congress, and the term "disposal" includes, inter alia, the leasing 
of such sites. 
29. The exclusion of cottage site leases from the contlict auction provisions in Idaho 
Code § 58·110(2) in the 1990 Act violates the limitation on legislative authority under Article 
IX, Section 8 and is void. 
30. The operation of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA(3) is integrally-related and indispensable 
to the operation of Idaho Code § 58-310A(2). The 1990 Act also contained no severability 
provision. Because the operative provisions of the 1990 Act are not severable, the entirety of 
Idaho Code § 58·31 OA is null and void, and the statute confers no lawful authority on the Land 
Board or Defendant Bacon, so that all actions of the Land Board implementing cottage site rents 
pursuant to the terms of § 58-3] OA are null and void. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
3]. The aJlegations of paragraphs 1 through 30 are incorporated by reference. 
32. The Land Board's actions described above, and most recently those at its March 
16, 20 I 0 meeting, violate the obligation imposed under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution to "secure the maximum long term financial return" to endowment land 
beneficiaries. In particular, the rental rate set pursuant to authority ostensibly granted under 
Idaho Code § 58-310A is substantially below the "maximum long term financial return" 
constitutionally mandated-a fact that a majority of the Board recognized in approving the most 
recent rental-rate fonnula. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
33. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 are incorporated by reference. 
34. Alternatively, in the event this Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58-3 lOA is 
constitutional, the Land Board's actions described above, including, but not limited to, its 
utilization of phase-in periods for rental increases to mitigate perceived hardships on lessees, 
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violate the obligation imposed under Idaho Code § 58-31 OA to secure market rent throughout the 
duration of each lease term. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
33. A declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to -
12] 7 that Idaho Code § 58-3] OA conflicts with, and therefore is rendered void by, the public 
auction requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and that no substantive 
provision in Idaho Code § 58-3] OA can be given effect. 
34. A declaratory judgment that the Land Board and Defendant Bacon possess no 
authority by virtue of [daho Code § 58-310A to enter into cottage site renewal leases for the 
2011-2020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and -310. 
35. A declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-120] to -
1217 that the current formula for determining cottage-site rental rates fails to "secure the 
maximum long term financial return" as required by Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
36. Alternatively, if Idaho Code § 58-310A is found to be constitutional, a 
declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-120 I to -1217 that the 
current formula for determining and implementing cottage-site rental rates fails to secure market 
rent throughout the duration of each lease term. 
37. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 65 against the 
Land Board and Director Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 2011-
2020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and -310. 
38. Alternatively, if Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is found to be constitutional, preliminary 
and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 against the Land Board and Director 
Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 2011-2020 period without 
compliance with the mandate in Idaho Code §§ 58-31 OA to secure market rent throughout the 
duration of each lease term. 
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39. Such other and further relief as deemed appropriate by this Court. 
DATED this 2nd day of December 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
By~;rJj--+L=VlL _____ ~. _ 
CLA Y R. SMITH 
Deputy Attorney General 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVE:'i L. OLSEN, ISB No. 3586 
Chief, Civil Litigation Di vision 
CLA Y R. SMITH, ISB. No. 6385 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
::_: ___ "....z~~ ft~Lt 
O£C 02 201l 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By eARLY LAllMORE 
DeP\JTl' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LA WRENCE G. WASDEN, in his 
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI. 
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND 
BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE BOARD OF LAND 
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, 
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho 
Department of Lands 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
c.;v OC 1023751 
:-..10. ____ _ 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff Lawrence A. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, hereby 
requests entry of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 65(e) enjoining (I) Defendant 
Bacon from presenting to Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners for its consideration 
and execution 2011·2020 leases for state endowment lands, known as "cottage sites," proximate 
to Payette and Priest Lakes and (2) Defendant Bacon and the president of Defendant State Board 
of Land Commissioners from executing such leases if presented. 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1 ORIGINAL 49 
AND AS GROUNDS THEREFOR states preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate 
under sub-paragraph (1) of I.R.C.P. 65(e) because the Attorney General ,jis entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or 
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually." The grounds 
for this motion are set out more specifically in the supporting brief filed simultaneously 
herewith. 
WHEREFORE, the Attorney General respectfully requests that the preliminary injunctive 
relief sought be granted. 
Dated this 2nd day of December. 2010. 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Deputy Attorney Genera.l 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
·'1 l '] k!3£ ::-~ BY __ ~~ ____________________ ___ 
CLAY R. SMITH 
Deputy A ttomey General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"?~ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of December 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
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o U.S. Mail 
o Hand Delivery 
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
o Overnight MaiJ 
o Facsimile: (208) 746·0753 
o Email: mclark@hawlevtroxeLl.com 
CLAY R. SMITH 
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FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIO~ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Attorney General has initiated this action, in part, to resolve the conflict between 
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 58-31OA The constitutional 
provision requires all lands held in trust by the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land 
Board" or "Board") for the benefit of various public entities--{;ommonly referred to as 
endo\\oment lands-to be disposed of through public auction. The public auction requiremc:nt 
complements the Land Board's attendant obligation to secure the maximum long-tenn return for 
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the beneficiaries from, inter alia. the sale or leasing of the endowment lands. The Legislature, 
however, eliminated the public auction requirement when it adopted 1990 Idaho Session Laws 
chapter 187, now codified at Idaho Code § 58-3\ OA (" 1990 Ace). 
As the State of Idaho's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General has an 
obligation to defend, where possible, the validity of legislative actions as part and parcel of 
representing the State's officers and entities. See Idaho Code § 67-1401(1). He is charged also 
~;th supervising "nonprofit corporations, corporations, charitable or benevolent societies, person 
or persons holding property subject to any public or charitable trust and . .. enforc[ing) 
whenever necessary any noncompliance or departure from the general purpose of such trust." ld. 
§ 67-1401(5). As an ordinary matter, discharging both of these duties simultaneously causes no 
difficulty because faithful adherence to, and enforcement of, state statutes often forms the 
predicate for carrying out the responsibilities assigned by § 67-1401(5). 
This is, however, the unusual situation. The Legislature departed from the public auction 
mandate in Article IX, Section 8 with regard to the leasing of cottage sites located on endowment 
lands. By ignoring the Constitution's unequivocal direction, the 1990 Act interfered with at least 
one purpose of the public auction requirement: to use the give-and-take of the free market as a 
mechanism for securing maximum long-term financial return for the endowment land 
beneficiaries. The Legislature recognized the vacuum left through elimination of the public 
auction requirement by imposing on Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land 
Board") the difficult task of administratively establishing "market rent." What is at issue for 
purposes of the present motion is not whether the Land Board has carried out that task 
adequately-the subject matter of the second claim for relief in the complaint-but whether the 
involved beneficiaries are entitled to the bargain struck by the Constitution's drafters requiring 
the endowment land leases to be subject to public auction. I They are, and the 1990 Act plainly 
I The second claim for relief challenges the rental rate fonnula established at the Land Board's March 16. 
2010 meeting-a rate which perpetuated a long history of leasing the endowment lands at issue here for 
amounts that have not secured to those lands' beneficiaries the "maximum long term financial return," 
The subject matter of the second claim was before the Supreme Court in Wasden ex ret. Stare v. Idaho 
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violates the bargain, as the Attorney General recently concluded in Attorney General Opinion 
09-1. See Strack Affd, Ex. 2 .. 
The preliminary injunction, if granted, will do nothing more than preserve the status quo 
during the pendency of this Jitigation. The Attorney General asks nothing more than that the 
Defendants be precluded from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases until the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA has been resolved. That issue is narrow, purely legal 
in character, and capable of expeditious resolution through motions under IRep 12 or 56. The 
Attorney General does not seek relief that would restrain the Land Board from taking appropriate 
action to extend existing leases pending final resolution of the challenge to § 58-31 OA's 
constitutionality. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The Idaho Constitution, Art. [X, § 8, required the Legislature, "at the earliest practicable 
period, [to] provide by law that the general grants ofland made by congress to the state shall be 
judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction 
for the use and benefit of the respective object for v·,rhich said grants of land were made." Article 
IX, Section 8, although variously modified since t 890, remains unchanged as to its public 
auction requirement and sets the controlling limits on legislative authority with regard to 
endowment land "disposal." 
One category of state endowment lands is land proximate to Payette and Priest Lakes. 
This land, in tum, has been administered over time as myriad parcels-the "cottage sites"-for 
leasing purposes. See Strack Aff., Ex. 3, at 6 ("2008 PAG Report,,).2 Currently, 167 cottage site 
State Board of Land CommIssioners, :\0. 37528 (Idaho S. Ct.), in the context of a petition for writ of 
prohibition. The petition was dismissed on December I, 2010, because of availability ofa plain, adequate 
and speedy remedy at law--i.e., injunctive relief under I.R.C.P. 65. See Wasden ex reI. Stale v. Idaho 
Siale Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 2010 Idaho No. 128, 2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1, 201 0). See AlT. of Steven 
W. Strack (,'Strack A ff."), Ex. I. The third claim for relief is pled in the alternative if this Court 
concludes that § 58-31 OA does not ,,'iolate Article IX, Section 8 and alleges that the rental rate established 
for the cottage site leaseholds at the Board's March 16,2010 meeting does not comply with the "market 
rent" requirement in subsection (l)(h) of the statute. 
2 The 2008 PAG Report. formally titled Analysis of Proceduresfor Residential Real Esla/e (Cottage Site) 
Leases on Idaho Endowment Lands, was prepared at Secretary of State Ysursa's request by Philip S. 
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leases are associated with Payette Lake and 355 leases with Priest Lake. /d. All leases have ten-
year durations and expire on December 31, 2010. Id. The deadline for, inter alia, existing 
lessees to make application for successor leases was April 30, 2010 (Idaho Code § 58-307(8) 
but was extended by IDL to June 18,2010. In anticipation of the leases' expiration, the Board 
directed Defendant Bacon at its March 2010 meeting to prepare a successor ten-year lease 
template.) Vpon informalion and belief, Defendant Bacon is anticipated to forward the form 
leases to existing lessees on or before December 6, 2010. Formal entry into the leases will 
require execution by Defendant Bacon and the Governor, who serves as Land Board president, 
after their execution by the affected lessee. Idaho Code § 58-121. 
ARGUMENT 
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE COTT AGE SITES' 
LEASING IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC Al'CTION REQUIREMENT IN ARTICLE 
IX, SECTION 8 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION, AND THE PRELIMINARY 
lNJUNCTION SOUGHT WILL PREVENT THE DEFENDANTS FROM ENTERING 
INTO LEASES WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH IDAHO CODE §§ 58-307 THROUGH 
-310 
I. Section 58-310A Violates The Idaho Constitution Under long-S.anding And 
Recently-Reaffirmed Authority 
Rule 65(e)(1), IRCP, authorizes a district court to grant a preliminary injunction "[w]hen 
it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or 
any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained ot~ 
either for a limited period or perpetually." The Supreme Court has counseled that "[tJhe 
substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that appellant[s] are entitled to the 
relief they demanded [under Rule 65(e}(I)] cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact 
exist which are not free from doubt." Harris v. Cassia County. 106 Idabo 513, 518, 681 P.2d 
Cook and Jay O'Laughlin on behalf of the Policy Analysis Group, College of l\atural Resources. 
University of Idaho, for use by the Land Board in its cottage site-related deliberations. 
3 Section 58-307, Idaho Code, was amended in 2008 to allow certain lands, including residential cottage 
sites, to be leased for periods up to 3S years. 2008 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 103 (codified at Idaho Code § 5&-
307(3». The Land Board nevertheless opted to maintain the ten-year period. 
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988, 993 (1984). This matter, in contrast to Harris, involves an otherwise settled issue of law 
and a straightforward set of largely, ifnot entirely, undisputed facts. 
The application of the public auction requirement to endowment land leasing has dra~n 
the Supreme Court's attention since the early part of the last century. The most recent treatment 
of this issue, as explained in Attorney General Opinion 09-01 at 8-10, was undertaken in a series 
of decisions rendered in response to litigation initiated by the Idaho Watersheds Project ("IWP"). 
/WP v. Stale Board, ]28 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996) ("IWP I"); fWP v. State Bd., 
133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999) ("JWP II"); IWP v. State Bd., 133 Idaho 64, 982 P.2d 367 
(1999) ("fWP HI"); lWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 68,982 P.2d 371 (l999) ("IWP IV"). In IWP 
I, the Court found the Board to have acted ultra vires when it issued a lease to an applicant that 
had failed to bid in a conflict auction held pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-310: 
The Board must find authority in the constitution and stalutes for its actions .. 
. . No such authority exists to support the Board's act of granting the lease to a person 
who did not place a bid at the conflict auction. Idaho Code § 58-310 requires an 
auction be held where, as in thjs case, there are two persons who have applied to lease 
the same state school land .... The rationale behind the requirement of conducting an 
"auction" is to solicit competing bids, v.ith the lease being granted to the bid that 
would, in the discretion of the Board, "secure the maximum long term financial 
return" to Idaho's schools .... The Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease 
to an applicant who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's 
constitutional and statutory mandate that the Board conduct an auction. Idaho Const. 
art. IX, § 8; I.C. § 58-310. 
128 Idaho at 766,918 P.2d at 1211 (some citations omitted). Although the Supreme Court held 
that the Land Board's leasing determination yiolated statutory directives, the Court also 
expressly relied on Article IX, Section 8's public auction mandate as a co-equal basis for its 
holding. 
The 1999 IWP trilogy followed suit. The IWP II Court sustained, on a procedural 
grounds, a challenge to a voter-approved constitutional amendment that, in part, would have 
modified Article IX, Section 8 "[t}o change the word disposal to sale in reference to the 
disposition of certain lands." 133 Idaho at 57, 982 P.2d at 360. The modification implicitly 
recognized that the term "disposal" in the constitutional provision extended beyond "sale" of 
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endo'hment land since, absent such a meaning, no need existed for the amendment itself. See, 
e.g., Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature, ]42 Idaho 640, 643, 132 P.3d 397, 401 (2006) 
("[ w]e should avoid an interpretation which would render terms of a constitution surplusage"). 
The Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-310B in IWP III under Article IX, Section 8 because it 
attempted "to provide income to the schools and the state in general" and, in so doing, violated 
the constitutional mandate to "'provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress 
to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to 
disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grams of 
land were made.'" 133 Idaho at 67, 982 P.2d at 370 (emphasis added by court). It then 
invalidated disqualification of IWP's lease application given the Land Board's reliance on 
otherwise impemlissible factors identified in § 58-31OB. 133 Idaho at 67-68, 982 P.2d at 370-
71. The Court gave similar effect to § 58-31 OB' s invalidity in IWP I V where, again, the Board 
had disqualified IWP's lease application. 133 Idaho at 71, 982 P.2d at 374. The common 
denominator in the lWP decisions, therefore, was the inclusion of endowment land leases within 
the scope of the term "disposal" as used in Article IX, Section 8.4 
In so construing "disposal," the Supreme Court was not writing upon a clean slate. It 
instead was adhering to an understanding of Article ]X, Section 8 first announced in Tobey v. 
4 The /WP trilogy is instructive concerning another constitutionally suspect feature of Idaho Code § 58-
310A: The legislative findings reflecting that the 1990 Act resulted in part from the fact that, "in the case 
of single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases, the conflict application and auction 
procedure have (sic} caused considerable consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the prospect 
of losing a long-time lease." [d. § 58-31 OA( 1 )( e). The Supreme Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-31 OB 
because it impennissibly directed the Land Board to consider interests other than the endowment land 
beneficiaries in making leasing determinations; so, too, § 58-310A retlects the Legislature's 
detennination to ameliorate existing lessees' "consternation and dismay" by removing the market force 
mechanism implicit in a public auction and substituting the Land Board's market rent assessment. Article 
IX, Section 8 requires the Legislature, not less than the Board. to act with undivided loyalty to the 
beneficiaries in making "maximum long tenn financial return" assessments, but the 1990 Act plainly was 
motivated by a desire to confer a benefit-the elimination of lease contlictors--on existing lessees. This 
additional ground for § 58-31 OA 's invalidation nevertheless need not be reached to resolve the first claim 
for relief because, even had the Legislature exercised unalloyed loyalty, it could not ignore the public 
auction mandate. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 6 57 
Bridgewood, 22 Idaho 566,127 P. 178 (1912). There, the Court considered a quiet title action 
involving application of a statute, now codified in Idaho Code § 58-601 without substantive 
amendment, that authorized the Land Board to issue a right-of-way to any person "desiring to 
construct over or upon any of the lands ov-ned or controlled by the state of Idaho, any ditch, 
canal, reservoir or other works for carrying or distributing public waters for any beneficial use." 
The statute, as originally adopted in ] 90 1 (1901 Idaho Sess. L. p. 191, § 8), required no 
compensation for such rights-of-way but was amended in 1907 to impose a $10 per acre 
minimum (1907 Idaho Sess. L. p. 527, § 1). [t did not require a public auction as a condition to 
the right-of-way's interest. The plaintiff in Tobey had acquired certain lands for reservoir 
purposes from the Land Board in 1909 by payment of the statutory minimum and compliance 
with certain other requirements after being directed by the Board to comply with the statutc. 
The Supreme Court used the dispute to discuss the breadth of the Land Board's authority 
under Article IX, Section 8 and the Legislature's authority under the Idaho Constitution's 
eminent domain provision, Article I, Section 14. The Court criticized the Board at the outset for 
requiring the plaintiff to follow the right-of-way statute because "an agreement and contract 
between [him] and [it] was made which cannot be construed as a lease of state land, neither is it 
the purchase of state land at public auction, under the provisions of the Constitution and the laws 
of the state, but is wholly without authority of law or legal sanction or authority, and violatcd 
specifically the inhibition as to the authority of tbe [Board] contained in the Constitution and the 
statutes." 22 Idaho at 580, 127 P. at 183 (emphasis added). 
However, the Court did not find the statute itself unconstitutional because it, along with a 
companion provision now codified at Idaho Code § 58-602 providing for the withholding of 
lands from sale when the Land Board concludes that their highest value is reservoir use, "in no 
way confer upon the [Board] any power that is prohibited by the Constitution, and it was not the 
intention of the Legislature in enacting said sections to in any way contravene the constitutional 
inhibition. but it was intended to carry out the provi sions found in sec. 14 of art. I of the 
constitution." 22 Idaho at 58l-82, 127 P. at 183. It then quoted the predecessor provision to 
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§ 58-603 for the apparent proposition that it exemplified the same use of eminent domajn 
authority. 22 Idaho at 582-83, 127 ~. at 184 .. The Court continued on to reiterate that the two 
reservo ir-related statutes 
were not intended to provide for a method or system of disposing of land 
belonging to the state which will have the effect of granting the right to the use or 
occupancy forever, or the right to enter upon state land or occupy it for the 
purpose of use as a reservoir on in appropriating water thereon, except that such 
right and use and occupancy is obtained under the provision of the Constitution 
and the statutory laws of the state. 
22 Idaho at 583, 127 P. at 184. The Court concluded by pointing to two statutes-now codified 
at Idaho Code §§ 7-703 and 42-1104, which in the first instance, identify state property as 
subject to taking by eminent domain and, in the other, allow the taking of state property for the 
purpose constructing rights-of-way "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining any ditch, 
canal, conduit or other works for the diversion or carrying of water for any beneficial use"-as 
"show[ingJ clead)' the intent of the Legislature to grant the right to take state land for a public 
use, just the same as private property." 22 Idaho at 585, 127 P. at 185. The Board's action, in 
other words, was not consistent with Article IX, Section 8 but was authorized under Article l, 
Section 14. 
Tobey thus left no doubt that Article IX, Section 8, insofar as it relates to the disposition 
of endowment lands, applies to the sale or rental of school trust lands but did not restrict the 
Legislature's constitutionally-independent power to enact eminent domain laws. The Supreme 
Court returned to the same jssue several years later in Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co. v. 
Fisher, 27 Idaho 695, 151 P. 998 (1915), another quiet titJe aCIion. The plaintiff there acquired a 
right-of-way in 1903 for purposes of constructing a reservoir under the same statute as the 
plaintiff in Tobey and had completed construction on two of the three anticipated facilities by 
1912 when the defendant acquired the same land from the State after a public auction. 
Chief Justice Sullivan, the only remaining member of the Tobey Court, wrote the 
principal opinion reversing the district court's judgment in the defendant's favor. His opinion 
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focused on the potential conflict between Article lX, Section 8 and the eminent domain provision 
in Article I, Section 14. It sought to reconcile the two constitutional sections and did so by 
restricting each provision's scope. The opinion devoted virtually all of its substantive analysis to 
Article I, Section 14 and the related eminent domain statute and held that "under the provisions 
of the Constitution which clearly contemplates the subjection of state lands to certain public 
uses, the title in fee does not pass to the condemnor under the eminent domain or other 
proceedings provided by the Legislature for the subjection of state lands to public uses." 
27 Idaho at 704, 151 P. at 1001; see also 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002 (under Article I, Section 
14 "only the necessary use of the land for reservoir or dam purposes is taken which may result in 
the perpetual use of such lands for that purpose, or only a temporary use, and the title in fee to 
the land remains in the state"). It further reasoned that "[b]y holding that [the] provisions of 
f Article IX,) Section 8 are applicable when the state parts with the fee, and not where it grants an 
easement, the sections of the Constitution in regard to the sale of school lands and of eminent 
domain can be made effective and harmonious." 27 Idaho at 705,151 P. at 1001. The principal 
opinion addressed Tobey quite briefly. It characterized the earlier decision as having "proceeded 
upon the theory that the fee-simple title was taken or disposed of by the state for the public use 
therein mentioned" but nevertheless overruled "the doctrine therein ... that is contrary to the 
views expressed in this opinion." 27 Idaho at 709,151 P. at 1002. 
Justice Morgan concurred in the principal opinion but solely "upon the ground that [the 
involved right-of-way statute] provides only for taking an easement or right of way upon or 
across schoo] Jands" rather than "for the sale or leasing of such lands" and thus did not 
contravene Article IX, Section 8. 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. 1002 (emphasis added). Justice Budge 
dissented, reasoning that "the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any law which provides for 
the disposition of lands granted to the state by an act of Congress in any manner than as 
expressly provided in the Act of Admission and in the Constitution~ that is, by sale at public 
auction." 27 Idaho at 719, 151 P. at 1006. The dissenting opinion additionally disagreed with 
the proposition that only an easement had been granted; instead, "[t]be taking of the state land in 
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question for reservoir purposes is, in effect and under [the eminent domain] statute, the acquiring 
of a fee-simple title to said Jands." 27 Idaho at 720, 151 P. at 1006. Consequently, all Justices 
participating in Idaho-iowa Lateral agreed that, where the sale or leasing of endowment lands 
occurs and eminent domain authority has not been exercised, the public auction strictures in 
Article IX, Section 8 apply. 
The Supreme Court returned to the public auction requirement subsequently in East Side 
Blaine County Live Slack Association v. Stare Board, 34 Idaho 807, ]98 P.760 (1921). There, 
the Court affirmed issuance of mandamus relief against the Land Board for failing to hold a 
public auction over a lease of state lands. It reasoned in part that 
The dominant purpose of these provisions of the Constitution and of the 
statutes enacted thereunder is that the state shall receive the greatest possible 
amount for the lease of schoo! lands for the benefit of school funds, and for this 
reason competitive bidding is made mandatory. . . . The provisions of the 
Constitution and lleasing] statutes above referred to made it the duty of the State 
Board of Land Commissioners, under the facts and circumstances of this case, to 
offer the lease of said lands at auction to the highest bidder, and the Board, in 
refusing to do so, failed in the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a 
duty resulting from its official position. In refusing to do so, its action ran counter 
to the provisions of the Constitution and statutes. 
34 Idaho at 814-15, 198 P. at 763. The IWP I Court concisely summarized issue in East Side as 
"whether school land leases had to be offered at a public auction, pursuant to Idaho's 
constitutional and statutory mandate[,]" and as holding "that state lands are be 'leased at public 
auction to the highest bidder therefore.''' 128 Idaho at 764, 918 P.2d at 1209. 
Given these seven opinions, no one can plausibly dispute that cottage site leasing must 
take place, at least where conflicting applications have been submitted, at a public auction to 
maintain fidelity with Article [X, Section 8. The 1990 Act, however,foreclosed the Land Board 
and the IDL from conducting such auctions. The legislative proscription thereby removes the 
ability of, and any incentive for, a potential applicant who is not an existing lessee to submit an 
applicatIon. In so doing, the Act ran directly counter to the explicit language of Article IX, 
Section 8 and imposed on the Board a duty-i.e., to make "market rent" assessments-that the 
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Constitution's drafters committed to public auction process in the first instance. Section 58-
310A is plainly unconstitutionaL See Wasden, 2010 Idaho No. 128 at 17 n.1O (Burdick, J., 
dissenting) ("[a]lthough not argued by any party here, I.e. § 58-3 lOA is clearly unconstitutional 
as-in eliminating the conflict auction procedure and instead requiring 'market rent'~the 
legislature encroached upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board"). 
II. A Preliminary Injunction Will Prevent The Land Board And Defendant Bacon 
From Entering Into Ten-Year Leases Without Compliance With Idaho Code §§ 58-
307 Through -310 And Simply Maintain The Status Quo During This Suit's 
Pendency 
The Attorney General seeks a very limited remedy in this motion: maintenance of the 
status quo untiJ the validity of the statute governing issuance of new cottage site leases is 
resolved by preventing the Defendants from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases. The 
declaratory relief requested as to the first claim for relief is limited similarly to a determination 
of Idaho Code § 58-310A's constitutionality, with a permanent injunction that probibits the Land 
Board and lDL from implementing the statute. The Attorney General, in sum, does not pursue 
any remedy that will affect the 2001·2010 leases acquired under a then-unchallenged statute. 
See State v. Village oj Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 526, 265 P.2d 328, 335 (1953) ("ra]n 
unconstitutional law should not be applied to work a hardship or impose a liability on one who 
has acted in good faith and relied on the validity of a statute before the courts have declared it 
invalid"). 
The quite narrow remedial scope of the relief sought in the first claim can be preserved, 
moreover, by the pendente lite relief presently sought. Should the Land Board and JDL enter 
into the new leases, the clock effectively would have to be unwound by invalidating the leases 
and beginning the application process afresh in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 through 
-310. See Am. ind. Party in idaho. inc. v. Cenarussa, 92 Idaho 356, 359, 442 P.2d 766, 769 
(1968) ("[ w}hen a statute by express language repeals a fonner statute and attempts to provide a 
substitute therefor, which substitute is found to be unconstitutional, the repeal of the former 
statute is of no effect, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the repeal to be 
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effective even though the substitute statute were found invalid"); Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Hufj~ 
58 Idaho 587. 592, 76 P .2d 923, 925 (1938) ("the law is clear that an unconstitutional 
amendment does not affect a previous statute, and the same remains undisturbed"). Relief at the 
post-execution stage thus would likely require joinder of the parties to the new leases under 
IRCP 19 and result in quite substantial, and unnecessary, procedural complexity that would 
retard expeditious resolution of this case. See generally 7 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1613, at 200-03 (3d ed. 2001) (" [i]n cases seeking reformation, 
cancellation, rescission, or otherwise challenging the vaJidity of a contract, aU parties 10 the 
contract probably will have a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation and their joinder 
wiH be required") (footnotes omitted). Preliminary injunctive relief is therefore particularly 
appropriate here. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion for preliminary injunction should be granted. 
DA TED this 2nd day of December 20 1 O. 
LA WRENCE A. WASDEN 
ATTOR-\lEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
Deputy Attorney General 
BYti~&J 
lay R. Smith 
Deputy Attorney General 
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FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JA1v1ES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN 1. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMIL Y 
] 988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOITE KlNNEY TRUST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RlC.E-lARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and 
MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
ofthe ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY 
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMA.,."l\.l 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH 1. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOW ARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAK-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ULA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRlCKSON, as Co-Trustccs of the 
I-mNRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HO~ and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN 1. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAl;'N KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the ESTATE OF 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CI~DY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JE~"-mE E. REITER; ROBERT D. and 
KATY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
FAMfLY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; O. 
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNlfER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of 1he 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULiE SURABIAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIl\ TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J'I 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER I 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co~ Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WlIITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JA YSON ARMSTRO~G, as Personal 
Representative of the EST ATE OF KA. "'mACE ' 
KEMP AR.\1STRONG, rcA. THY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; 
SUZANNE zrMMERMAN~ LINDA S. TURNER; 
GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS~ I 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as j 
Director of the ldaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, and pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56, and move this Court for its Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs on Counts I and II of their Amended Complaint on file in this matter. 
This motion is supported by the Plaintiffs Mernorandtun in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims, the Affidavit of Colleen D. Zalm filed herewith, and 
all pleadings and papers on file in this action. 
Oral argument i~ested. 
DATED this 0' fay of December, 20 I O. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
By~~~~~~==~~ ____ __ 
Phillip S. bcrrecht - Of the Firm 
Colleen . Zahn - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the r day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701- J 617 
Fax No. 954-5210 
[B U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o TeJecopy 
o Electronic Transmission 
mcJark@hawlcytroxell.com 
jashbylal,hawleytroxeIl.com 
COlleen~ • P= 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
rSB #1904.l1so(ll),hallfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarJey.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\4\4-682.IIPLEADINGS\MSJ - Memo doc 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYK1'vfAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAlN R. TARRANT and 
JANET 1. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ULA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KExr 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRICKSON, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN FAMILY TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA illPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH 1. I 
HON; RlCHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEI", as i 
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the EST ATE OF 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE ~1CK and JAN LARREA~ 
SHARON 1. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCK1NLEY; VIVIAN 
MC~lGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMlLY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED 1. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLlAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCII; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA HI 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KlMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
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PARK. and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAK PISTEY 
TRUST; JEAh1NE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KATY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
P A..\fELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; O. I 
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES I 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JA~ES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARABARA SMITII, as Co-Trustees of the 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
scon THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURl"JER; 
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; 1. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE. 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZJMMER, as Co· Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5,1998; 
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN; LINDA S. TURNER; 
GLORlA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAl\'O COMMISSIONERS; 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity liS 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, 
P,A., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, submit this memorandum in support of 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, and Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their 
contract claims, which are contained in Counts I and n of their Amended Complaint in this 
matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners (hereinafter "Land Board") entered into 
lease agreements with the Plaintiffs for cottage sites at Payette Lake. The leases are co-signed 
and administered by Defendant Idaho Department of Lands (hereinafter "Department of Lands"). 
The leases provide a right to renew, and Plaintiffs have exercised that right. 1bc Department of 
Lands has rejected Plaintiffs' requests to renew their leases and instead informed Plaintiffs that it 
will unilaterally impose new leases on Plaintiffs with new terms, including a new ren.tal rate 
formula, 
The law is clear that when the lease fails to specify a different rent for the renewal term, 
the existing rent continues for the renewal term. Plaintiffs seek an Order directing the Land 
Board and Department of Lands to renew the existing leases for the renewal period. In the 
alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the fair market value of their 
improvements constructed on the leasehold premises, as provided by the lease terms. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Land Board entered into leases \\oith each of the Plaintiffs, which concern parcels of 
State Endowment Land near and around Payette Lake (hereinafter "the cottage site leases"). See 
Affidavit of Bob Bramer ("Bramer A.ff "), , 2 and Exh. A. The Land Board drafted the lease 
document, which is for a I O-year period beginning on January I, 2001 and ending on December 
31, 2010. See Id. Each Plaintiff agreed to the lease tenus which are the same as those contained 
in the lease attached as Exhibit "A" to the Bramer Affidavit. TIlls lawsuit concerns two lease 
sections, which provide a right to renew the existing lease tenns. Lease section C.I.l gives 
Plaintiffs the right to renew the existing lease: 
C. LEASE TERMIRENEWAL 
1.1 Provided by Statute. The term of this lease shall be for no more than ten 
(10) years pursuant to Idaho Code (I.C.) § 58-307(1)', and for the period of years 
as set forth in the attached cover lease. Renewals of this lease may be granted by 
the LESSOR as determined by the LESSOR at the LESSOR'S discretion pursuant 
2 to I.e. § 58-3 lOA . 
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs' right to renew is again addressed in lease section K.1.4.b, which 
affirms the State will not unreasonably withhold approval of Plaintiffs' applications to renew: 
1.4.h. I.:pOD Non-Renewal By Lessor. Should LESSEE appJy to renew this 
lease in the manner provided by law and such application be denied, then 
LESSOR shall purchase the approved improvemt::nts placed or caused to be 
placed on the leased premises by LESSEE, at the fair market value of such 
improvements as of the effective date of the expiration. Fair market value of 
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal 
by the LESSEE shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
(Emphasis added.) This section also provides that if the Land Board denies renewal applications, 
the Land Board will compensate Plaintiffs for the fair market value of their improvements. 
I At the time the leases were executed, Idaho Code Section 58-307 provided for a maximum 10- year lease tenn. 
2 Idaho Code Section § 58-310A provides cottage site leases are not subject to the conflict auction procedure 
applicable to other categories of State endowment lands, and that in the absence of conflict auctions the Land Board 
is to enSure there are stable leases ir: place that generate market rent. 
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The current lease does not specify a rental rate to be charged during the renewal term that 
is any different than the lease's rental rate formula during the original lease period. Section 
D. 1.1, provides the rent formula to be used: 
1.1 Rental Rate. Rent shall be two and one half (2.5%) of current fee simple 
value of the leased premises, as determined by valuation administered by 
the LESSOR or by valuatiDn as determined by the assessor. The value of 
the leased premises shall be determined as though the leased premises is 
vacant and unimproved, subject to any outstanding rights and reservations 
of record, and without any deduction or credit for LESSEE-owned site 
improvements. This rental rate was adopted and approved by the Idaho 
State Board of Land Commissioners on December 14, 1998. 
On March 16, 2010, the Land Board voted to increase the rent formula for new leases 
beginning January I, 2011, from 2.5% of the appraised value to 4% of a ten-year average of the 
appraised value. See Bramer Aff., Exh. C, pp. 36-37. The increase from 2.5% to 4% will be 
phased in over a 5-ycar period. See Jd. 
Plaintiffs timely applied to renew their existing cottage site leases in a writing sent to the 
Department of Lands tithing the statutory time period, thereby salisfying the legal requirements 
to renew their leases. See Affidavit afColleen D. Zahn ("Zahn Aff"), ~ 2 and Exh. A. In doing 
so, Plaintiffs expressly reserved their right to renew on the same terms as set forth ln the existing 
lease. See ld In a letter dated March 3], 2010, the Department of Lands refused to recognize 
Plaintiffs' renewal notices, and stated that Plaintiffs were required to fill out a renewal 
application created by the Department of Lands, which is not a requirement imposed by statute 
or the lease. See Bramer Ajf, Exh. D. The Department also stated that renewal would only be 
available on the terms offered by the Land Board in their entirely new lease. See [d. 
The March 3 1 letter included what the Department caned a "template" lease. See Id The 
template was watennarked with the word "Template" across the front of each page, did not 
provide any identifying infonnation specific to particular lessees, and did not contain a signature 
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bJock. See Id. The Department stated it would contact the lessees should any action be taken by 
the Land Board that would change the lease template, thus indicating the template was simply a 
draft and potentially subject to further revision. See [d. The Department also indicated that in 
early fall it would send out lease documents for the new leases to those lessees that returned the 
Department of Lands' form. See Id 
Out of an abundance of caution and not wanting to give the Department of Lands a 
reason to argue Plaintiffs failed to timely apply for renewal, Plaintiffs retumed the Department of 
Lands' renewal fonn, reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them by 
the Department of Lands. See Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn.J The current 
lease tenn is set to expire in less than a month, yet as of the date of this motion Plaintiffs have 
not received new leases. However, based on the statements contained in the Department of 
Lands' March 31 letter and the actions of the Land Board on March 16, Plaintiffs believe the 
new leases will contain new terms, including the increased rent formula approved by the Land 
Board on March 16. 
In order to protect their lease rights, Plaintiffs filed Ibis lawsuit on October 22,2010. The 
suit alleges two claims for breach of contract--one seeking to compel specific perfonnance of 
the renewal term, including continuation of the 2.5% rent formuJa, and the other an alternative 
claim, seeking compensation for site improvements due to the Land Board's refusal to renew the 
current leases. See Amended Complaint, ,.~ 28-41. These are the two claims at issue in this 
partial summary judgment motion. 
J This assertion is made on infmmation and belief, and could be confmned if the Defendants had timely responded 
to discovery requests the Plaintiffs served on them on October 22, 2010. See Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn, 1 3. 
Defendants' responses to the discovery requests were due November 22, but Defendants have refused to provide 
responses. 
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For the reasons set forth below, the Land Board's attempt to unilaterally impose a new 
lease with a new rent fonnula on existing lessees constitutes a breach of the lease's renewal 
provisions. There are no genuine issues of material fact at issuc, and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment as a matler of law, granting them specific performance of the existing lease terms 
during the renewal period, including continuation of the 2.5% rent formula. In the alternative, if 
the Court refuses to require the Land Board to approve Plaintiffs' applications to renew the 
existing leases, Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance, in the form of compensation from 
the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands, for the market value of their respective 
improvements . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole 
Fence Co., Inc, 134 Idaho 626, 628, 7 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2000). If, however, the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matler of law, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Selkirk Seed Co. v. State 
Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 436-37, 18 PJd 956, 958-59 (2000). 
I11I 
11// 
/111 
1I1I 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The EXisting Rent Formula Is Applkablc DUTing the Renewal Period. 
A. The leases unambiguously provide Plaintiffs a right t() renew tbe 
existing leases. 
A lease is a contract, and therefore what controls when interpreting a lease is the parties' 
intent and the plain meaning of the contract language. See JR. Simp!of Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138 
Idaho 557, 564, 67 P.3d 36, 43 (2003). The intent of the parties should, if possible, be 
ascertained from the language of the documents. See Twin Lakes Village Property Assoc., Inc. v. 
Twin Lakes Investment, 124 lelaho 132, 135,857 P.2d 611, 614 (1993). In construing a written 
instrument, the court must consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the 
writing to the extent possible. See Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437, 18 
PJd 956, 959 (2001). 
The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect is a question of law when the 
contract is clear and unambiguous. See lei. In deciding whether a document is ambiguous, a 
court must detennine whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." See Chavez 
V. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 2]9, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008). In the absence of ambiguity, the 
document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning 
derived from the plain wording of the instrument. See /d. In other words, unambiguous 
contracts must be interpreted as written. Culp v. Tri-Counly Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 899, 
736 P.2d 1348, 1353 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The cottage site leases at issue in this matter unambiguously provide Plaintiffs with a 
right to renew the leases. Section C.l.1 provides for renewals of this lease. Neither Section 
C.t.l, nOT any other section of the lease imposes any different terms upon renewal. While 
Section c.1.1 does provide renewals may be granted at the Lessor's discretion, Section K.1.4.b 
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provides that approval of a request for renewal shall not be unreasonably withheJd. Plaintiffs 
have complied with all statutory and contractual requirements to renew their leases. See 
Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn, Til 2-3 and Exh. A. There is no reason to believe that any of the 
Plaintiff lessees have defaulted under, or otherwise failed to comply in good faith with the terms 
of the leases. The Department of Lands, however, has rejected the Plaintiffs' notices of renewal 
without explanation for its refusal to renew the existing leases. Defendants, therefore, have 
breached the leases by refusing, without reasonable cause, to renew the leases. 
In the event the Land Board chooses not to grant a request to renew, the lease is likewise 
unambiguous in requiring the Land Board andlor Department of Lands to compensate Plaintiffs 
for the fair market value of their improvements: 
1.4.b. Upon Non-Renewal By Lessor. Should LESSEE apply to renew this 
lease in the manner provided by law and such application be denied, then 
LESSOR shall purchase the approved improvements placed or caused to be 
placed on the leased premises by LESSEE. at the fair market value of such 
improvements as of the effective date ofthe expiration. Fair market value of 
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal 
by the LESSEE shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
(Emphasis added.) See Id. at § K.1.4.b, 
B. The failure to specify a rent formula for tbe renewal period means the 
existing rent formula applies during the renewal period. 
Al1hough Idaho's appellate courts do not appear to have addressed the rent term to be 
applied during a renewal period when a lease fails to specifY such a rental rote, multiple other 
appellate courts have done so. As is intuitively obvious, where a lease covenant for renewal is 
general and does not state the terms of the renewal lease, the new lease is to be upon the same 
general terms and conditions as the old lease, including that of rent. See Little Caesar 
Enterprises, Inc. 11. Bell Canyon Shopping Center, I.C., 13 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
(quoting Cummings v. Rytting, 207 P.2d 804, 805 (Utah 1949) ("It has long been settled in Utah 
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that '[w]herc the covenant for renewal is general and does not state the terms of the renewal 
lease, the new lease is to be upon the same general tenns and conditions as the old lease. '''); See 
also Bishop Cafeteria Co. afOmaha v. Ford, 129 N.W.2d 581,587-88 (Neb. 1964) (<<Wnere the 
covenant for renewal is general and docs not state the terms of the renewal lease, the new lease is 
to be upon the same general terms and conditions as the old lease, which are applicable to the 
renewal period."); Yamin v. Levine, 206 P.2d 596, 597 (Colo.1949) ("A general covenant to 
extend or renew implies an additional term equal to the first, and upon the same terms, induding 
that of rent."); Idol v. Little, 396 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("Accordingly, 
consistent with lv/cAdoo and Young, an optional renewal provision in a lease which is silent on 
the amount of rent due upon renewal of the lease and which does not provide that the renewal 
rent will be set by the parties' future agreement is valid and enforceable, and the amount of rent 
due upon renewal is impliedly the amount of rent due under the original lease."); Aldridge v. 
Young, 689 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ("It is an established rule that a general 
covenant to renew or extend a lease which is siLent as to the terms of the renewal or extension 
implies a renewal or extension upon the same 1erms and conditions as provided in the original 
lease .. .it is implied that the rent is the same as that provjded in the original lease. "); Penilla v. 
Gerstenkorn, 261 P. 488, 489 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1927) ("A general covenant to extend or 
renew implied an additional term equal to the first, and upon the same terms, including that of 
rent, except the covenant to renew; to include which would make the lease perpetua1."). Legal 
treatises are in accord. See 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 101, 102 (2010); 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 134 (2010); Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leases, § 14:1 at *14-8. 
(2010). The inc1usion of a general renewal clause, however, only entitles the Jessee to one 
additional term of renewal and does not incorporate another renewal term unless a new 
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agreement is executed that provides otherwise. See Bishop, 129 J\'.W.2d at 587; PenilJa, 261 P. 
at 670; See also Friedman on Leases, § 14: 1 at 14-11. 
Of partlcular significance in this case is an Arizona decision holding that a clause 
granting the lessee an option to renew "this lease," incorporated by reference all tenns of the 
existing lease: 
The contested language provides the lessee with an option to "extend this lease," 
which is a general covenant to renew devoid of any explicit recitation of the 
amount of rent to be paid during the extended torm. However, by referring to 
"this" lease, the option provision incorporates by reterence all the rest of the lease 
agreement, including the provision specifying a rental rate of $1400 per month. 
Thus the option provision imports a new lease on the same terms and conditions. 
See McCutchin v. SC'A Services of Arizona, Inc., 709 P.2d 591, 592-93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
The same "this lease" language is used in the renewal provision contained in section C.l.l of the 
cottage site leases. The Land Board drafted the lease and therefore could have provided the rent 
to be charged for the renewal term. Instead of doing so, however, it chose to remain silent, 
thereby indicating its intent to continue under the same rent formula for the renewal tenn. The 
lease terms provide for the adjustment of rent based on the appraised value of the properties, 
thereby ensuring the leases generate market rent during the lease tenn. 
The Land Board detennined the terms of the existing leases, and decided to grant a 
general r1ght of renewal. The lessees agreed to the lease terms. The Land Board cannot now 
ignore the lease tenns that it drafted, and attempt to unilaterally discard various provisions of the 
leases it created. The Court may not impose a term on the pa."ties' contract that was not 
otherwise agreed to by the parties. See Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielsen, 136 Jdalto 
814, 823.41 P.3d 242, 251 (2001); See also Medical Svc 's Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310 
Benev. And Prot. Order of Elks, ] 26ldalto 90, 95, 878 P.2d 789, 794 (et. App. 1994). The Land 
Board's attempt to force new Lease terms on the renewing Plaintiffs constitutes a breach of the 
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existing lease's renewal provisions, and will prevent Plaintiffs from enjoying the benefits of their 
lease contracts, violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every 
contract. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count I of their Amended 
Complaint. 
2. Plaintiffs Are Entitled tv Specific Performance of tbe Lease Terms. 
Plaintiffs have prayed for specific performance on Count J of their Complaint, seeking an 
Order enjoining the Land Board from changing the terms in the leases. Specific performance is 
an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to provide relief when the legal remedies 
are inadequate. Garner v Barlschi, 139 Idaho 430, 435, 80 P.3d ] 03], ] 036 (2003); See also 
Karterman v. Jameson, 132 Idaho 910,914,980 P.2d 574,578 (Ct. App. 1999). It is generally 
presumed that a contract for the sale or lease of 1and does not enjoy an adequate remedy at law 
and is entitled to specific performance. See Karlerman, 132 Idaho at 913, 980 P.2d at 577. In 
this instance, Plaintiffs' lease rights are unique property rights. There is no adequate remedy at 
law if they are deprived of their right to continued possession under the existing lease terms, 
including the current rent formula. Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the renewal 
clause, including incorporation of the existing rent formula. 
3. In tbe Alternative, Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Receive Compensation 
For Their Improvements. 
Count II of the Amended Complaint pleads an alternate claim seeking specific 
performance of the lease term providing Plaintiffs compensation for their improvements. In the 
event the Court refuses to grant Plaintiffs' request to reneW on the same lease terms, the lease 
unambiguously requires the Land Board and/or Department of Lands to compensate Plaintiffs for 
the fair market value of their improvements. See Bramer AjJ., Exh. A, § K.] A.b. 
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Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe they have two alternate remedies, and the law grants 
Plaintiffs the right to elect which remedy they choose. Ejection of remedies is the right of a 
party in an action to choose one of two or more co-existing remedial rights, where such rights 
arise out of the same facts; but the term is generally limited to a choice by a party between 
inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to or the 
repudiation of the other. Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97 Idaho SOl, 505, 547 P.2d 546, 550 
(J 976) (abrogated by statute on other grounds). One of the elements which is a prerequisite to 
application of the doctrine is that the remedies available be inconsistent. Id. That is certainly 
present in this case. The lease terms do not permit Plaintiffs to both remain in possession under 
the existing rent fonnula, and receive compensation for their improvements. Both remedies are 
based on the same fact-the Land Board's breach of the lease's renewal term. Plaintiffs have 
established a right to elect their remedy, and the Court's Order granting summary judgment 
should accordingly include language reflecting Plaintiffs have the right to this election. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to a partial summaI)' judgment, 
holding that Defendants have breached the renewal term of Plaintiffs' cottage site leases. 
Plaintiffs are also entitled to partial summary judgment aJlo,ving them to elect their remedy in 
this matter, either: (1) granting them specific performance to continue in possession of the lease 
premises during the renewal period under the existing lease terms, including the rental rate 
formula; or (2) allowing them to surrender possession of the leased premises and directing 
Defendants to pay them compensation for the fair market value of their improvements. 
//1/ 
111/ 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thIs r day of December, 201 D. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
BY:~~~~~~~-C~~§L __ _ 
Phillip S. 0 rrecht - Of the Firm 
Colleen D. ~ahn - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7~Of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the fonowing: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HA \llLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA VlLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Fax No. 954-5210 
~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy 
o Electronic Transmission 
mc1ark@hawleytroxell.com 
jashby(al.hawleytroxelL.com 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
ISB #1904. pso@hallfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL. FARLEY. OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W \4\4-0&2. J IPI.2ADINGSIMSJ--IIFOB--Aff Zahn.doc 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC1AL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRGST; LAURA L. BARCLA y~ 
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAl-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MOl\TFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE F AMIL Y 
1988 TRUST; CHRlSTINE M. CAR.'1EFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER~ LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRGST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RlCHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and 
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BE~ETI G. DAY and DON'NA DAY 
Case No. CV 2010-436C 
AFFIDAVIT OF COLLEEN D. 
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
.\{ARJORlE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAP!'vfAN 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DfXIE DYK.1VfAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; M1CHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL~ 
RONALD and STACY 1. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK.; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRICKSON, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKIvfAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; M1CHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DA \\IN J. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUK KAY; KARIN KJNG, as 
personal representative for the EST A TE Of 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY F AMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN I 
.\IfCKl';1GHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & . 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHa, 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'~EIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
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P ARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY. as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANNE E. REITER; ROBERT D. and 
KA TY 1. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARABARA SMJTH, as Co-Trustees of the I 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as I 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRlSTOPHER C. 
TIIOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J. 
LA..\40NTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARlTAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTROl\G, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KA TIIY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP I 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; 
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN~ LINDA S. TURNER; 
GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COfvfMISSIONERS; 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
S8. 
County of Ada ) 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in this marter, and as such I 
have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a "Notice of Election 
Exercising Option to Renew Residential Site Lease." which was signed by the trustee of Plaintiff 
The Babcock Trust, and mailed to Defendants Idaho Board of Land Commissioners ("Land 
Board") and Idaho Department of Lands ("Department of Lands") in March 2010. The 
document provided Defendants notice of the Trust's exercise of its right to renew its cottage site 
lease under the existing lease terms, including the rental rate term. A review of documents 
received from Defendant Department of Lands pursuant to a public records request, reveals the 
majority. jf not all the P1aintiffs, mailed Notices with substantially similar language to the 
Department of Lands, providing notice of their intent 10 exercise their rights to renew their 
cottage site leases. 
3. In March 2010, the Department of Lands mailed aU Plaintiffs a letter, rejecting 
the Notices referred to in paragraph 2 of this Affidavit, and indicating that if Plaintiffs wished to 
renew their leases, they would need to ftll out a Department of Lands form. An exa.'nple of this 
letter is attached as Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Bob Bramer on file in this matter. Based on 
infonnation and belief, all Plaintiffs timely returned the Department of Lands form, giving notice 
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that they intended to exercise their contractual right to renew their respective cottage site leases, 
but reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them. See Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto as a true and correct example of one of those forms returned by the Plaintiffs to 
the Department of Lands. Plaintiffs have propounded discovery requests to Defendants, seeking 
documents that would substantiate this assertion, but Defendants have thus far refused to provide 
responses to the discovery requests until a decision is issued on Defendants' pending motion to 
dismiss. Plaintiffs shall file a motion to compel these discovery responses. When Plaintiffs 
receive Defendants' discovery responses, they should be able to provide the Court with evidence 
that Plaintiffs did return the Department of Lands fonn. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
Colleen ~ ~ .1,L 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day ofDeccmber, 2010. 
~dr~ 
My Commission EXPires:~jy;y-,3j=-' ::,1.?4,i,-'I_.:L _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the --f- day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Fax No. 954-5210 
lE U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
o Electronic Transmission 
mclark@bawleytroxell.com 
jashby@,hawleytroxeU.com 
COIl~·!t~ 
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r 
NOTICE OF ELECTION EXERCISING OPTION TO RENEW RESIllENTIAL 
SITEy;ASE 
The undersigned Jessee herebYllCrves notice to the Stato of Idaho. Ide.bo 
Department of Lands, and it., &ard of Lund Commissioners, of the undcnigncd lessee's 
exerei.se of its option 10 renew the lease sC.llted below for an additional term of ten (l0) 
years, effective January [. 2011 or \lpon tho expiration of the undersigned leasc. it is 
furdl(:r understood that Iossec's option will he exercised on the same terms as set forth in 
the current ICllse. but with the rental rate theret'oce at a reasonable andlor market rent, not 
exceeding the annual rate of 2.5% of the leased propcny's appra1sed or assessed value, 
whichever is leas. 
Lease Property: The Babcock Trust 
Lease Number: R5082 
Lessee (slgnature): 
Name (print): The Babcock Trust by Gladys Babcock as Trustee 
Date: 
Current Address: 
Telephone: 
E-lJUIiJ ; 
March 11, 2010 
c/o Diane Babcock, 2100 Habersham Marina Road 
#301A, Cumming, GA 30041 
404-915-4909 
d babco~hotlllail.com( plttotten@gtotts.com 
~ 
....... 
" . ~ ':':!l 
:;:; :;;-;, 
P l r-..' 
\1:; 
(~"~i 
-0 
.:r; :;L, 
(.:.~. r;.:> 
U1 
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EXHIBIT "8" 
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Idaho Department of Lands 
300 North 61h Street, Suite 103 
P.O. Ball 83720 
Boise. ldaho 83720-0050 
REsgVATION OF RIGHIS 
Re: Reservation ofRigbts Re: Cottage Site Lease 
To Idaho Department of Lands: 
Enclosed is the elC:ecutcd Application for Use of State Lands which the State of Idaho has 
demlUlded that we execute if we want to preserve our rights in our leased property as doscribed 
below. 
We previously exercised our right to renew OUf existing Cottage Site Lease ("Lease") 
pursuant to the terms of that Lease. Our effort to renew :n accordance with the terms of our 
existing arrangement has been rejected by the State of Idaho and instead we are being compelled 
to sign the Application for Use in order to protect our substantia1 mvestment in our leased 
property. Accordingly, we reserve all of our rights under our ex.isting Lease as well lIS our right 
to renew that Lease. 
By lhe execution oftbe Application for Use at your insistence, we are not waiving any of 
our substantial rights that we currently have and are doing so solely in order to protect our 
investment in our property. 
Leased Property: ')...4s8 fANIV~"'41rY ~,' /\fc;.~, 'D f!'J'1ii' 
It. -- ;: i> S?-. Lease NO.: ___ -A-__ .,.....--.4,.....j..-----------
Lessee (S ignalurc 
Name (Print)::l!:1'fJ1!:.::.TiLt.J.' J"I/~~...J,i:!C!1(,d,;.a::!~~:..t-.:::..!~~~~~~ 
Date: -.:1JI-!..I..;;..r..:..!t:-o _________ -_~ 
CurrcJ1tAddress: '("L{ Bl.u4.wtJO/j Av'~.) !JolU.s ~t HY/-of:;:il':l.. 
Telephone:(j10 l{7f' -e~ -$::''''-
E-Mail: AtY~·.5A-t-~@II~.NG.r-
111 
APPLICATION FOR USE OF 
STATE LANDS 
No,.: AI! IIPPlJctJrion left .,. tJD/HflfundBbs.. /noOm/Jlflte app/IcatlOflS wJlf b9 f'Bjttct8d lind f8tlJmed to spp/fcant. 
- APplicANT DATA: All documBnIB must conla/n rhe fuIJ flllflai nams of the Bpplic8nt or the blJ$lrtsss 9ntlly name on rile with 
, S CBffIti. Iff of Good SffJf1di'n{J IJSI be provided for all bus1n9ss lioo If dd1t~ I It t fJla Idaho S~at.tl)' 0 tat.. iCS m fN'I s. a ona epp cans 
chfICk Me and add AftaChmBnt B. 
IndiYldu •• Nllme: Business Entity Name: 
Last SaI!:zman 
Flrwt Mgl1ln Bualness Registration No. 
Middle J 
DBA: 
Address of Record (for AU. t:OtTe$pondenca) Contact tnformldlon 
Street: 84 BeRewood A'Ie Business: 
PO Bo~: COntact Nllme: 
City: Dobbs Ferry Fax: 
Stete: NY Cont.ct Name: 
Zip +4: 10522 Home: 
Country: Contact Name: 
Attention: Cefl "!"1M CodWPl'IDnel: Contact Name: 
Title: 
Email Addres_(ts): 
DESCRIBE PROPOSED USE (check htn ~"d BttadJ IIdtJltkmlll pages If ntHlded): 
Residential - Cottage 
PROVIDE LEGAL DESCRIPTloN(S) ON ATTACHMENT A 
( hereby certify that I am the applicant or authorized representative of th8 applicant and that the informstlon 
r::ontalned in this appllcatlo/1 Is true and COfTeCl to the besl of my knowledge end further acknOwledge that 
falsification of any Information contained herein, or provided herewJth, wDi be graun for rejection of the 
application. 
Date ~ -;vi) ')-IJIO 
Business Name (If applicable) 
Stille of t-.NU.J -:cJlg, ) TIlle (if applicable) 
~ JJss. 
COl.1I11y orc..t..a.&0\9.). .. ... /\ _ • s: .L _ J ~I ~ 10 I~I.} r'\.-(~~ 
On this ~ 'I day of. , in the year 2Ol.-. personally appeared c..-t...ri\{1{\-0 
known Or id9nti/ied to me to be the Pbr ~ name is subscribed to the within Instrument, and acknowledged 10 me thal 
he/shallhey executed tile sarna. 
Current Im.trument No.B5052 
New In&tnlment No. R5000s2 
NOI.",e,blo ~, 
My Commission Expires: {).It:.. & I ~I cloIu 
f'._~~i"iti Bf!ni!ieQ)jf!! l!sa ~!ltl&iiCQ!la9§ ~. ;'(lB :L~ .. rut 
Ro,. ~T;'G 
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Current Instrument No. ~ 
!Wn BmI IEIRD. 
lIN 03E 04 
. ~.- -, .. _---
-
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PaecrlpUon 
(fo""~ , /'IrnIIfIIIIl-"''' «.11 __ • If 
.,.alllfl; 
LoU 
~ ...... 
.kI!mIY. Ill!: 
.ElmIO. 
V.lay NS 
--
---- ---
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Attachment B - Multiple Applicants 
business tIIlIfity, informstlon reqUfrfJd for stl bW/nflSS principals. " 
Current Instrument No. R5052 .... New Instrument No R500052 . 
Indlvldual Name: '~'" 0". 1..1lM~J)) ~ Business Entity Name: 
Last 4. ..... -, 
FIrst c.Y...,nHA- Buslne.s Reglltratlca ND. MIddle 1.. 
DBA: 
Addren 01 Record (for ALL corre_portdenott} Com.et Information 
Street: ~c(U~~IW", Business: 
POBox: Contact Name: 
City: t>DSes. ~~~:< Fu:: 
Stllte: H~ Contact Nllme; 
ZIp ..... : l If) <""').?" ? '3 ') ~ Home: Country: Contact Name; 
Attention: 
Title: Cell AIWII CadWPhonel: 
Contact Nama: 
Email Addr"s(CI8}; 
Individual Name: 
~t Bu.tn_ Entity "" __ : 
First 
Bu ..... Registration No. Middle 
DBA: 
Address of Record (lor ALL corresportdence) Contact Information 
BUIlIn_: 
Street: Contact Name: 
--PO Box: Fax: 
City: Contact NM1e: 
State: Home: Zip +4: Contact NanM: 
Country: 
Attention: Ceil AI'INI Coda'Phonel: 
TIDe: Contact NIIIYI.: 
email Addreq(e$): 
APPUCATJOH· Page 3 of 3 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
Vi: C 1 ~ lOin ISS #1904, pso@hallfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISS #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
J. DAVID NAV.4F1liO, CIQ,I., 
Sy I!. NOIJ.U;g 
O:::;"vr", 
Post Office Box J271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\ol\4-682.1IWasden v ILS-State CourtIIntervene-Mtn.doc 
Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE O. WASDEN, in his capacity 
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex ref. STATE 
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS, 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
COME NOW, the Proposed Defendants in Intervention, Babcock, et al., the holders of 
Payette Lake Cottage Site Lessees identified in the [Proposed] Answer and Notice of 
Intervention, by and through their undersigned attorneys, and hereby move this Court, pursuant 
to Rule 24 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to intervene in this case as additional 
party defendants. 
Accompanying this motion, and attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is the (Proposed] Answer 
and Notice ofIntervention, submitted herewith pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil P:-ocedure 24( c). 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1 
o 
:::0 
-G) 
-Z 
)::> 
r-
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The Motion to Intervene is supported by the accompanying Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Intervene, Affidavit of W. Anthony Park in Support of Motion to Intervene, and all 
other pleadings and documents on file in this matter. 
DATED this It'~ of December, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
By:-+~.JlL~~~:::::::~~~ __ _ 
Phillip S. berrecht - Of the Firm 
Colleen . Zahn - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICAT F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ ay of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven L. Olsen 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
CJay Smith 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
POBox 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA WLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-161 7 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - 2 
D fif.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 854-8073 
D Email 
.com 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
ISB #1904, pso@hallfarley.com 
Colleen D. Zahn 
ISS #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:14\4-682.1\Wasden \I ILB·Slale Courtllntervene Answer<doc 
Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity 
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. STATE 
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA TE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS, 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity 
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI. STATE 
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS, 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants, and 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - I 
Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751 
(PROPOSEDJ ANSWER AND 
NOTICE IN INTERVENTION 
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vs. 
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY; 
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE F AMIL Y 
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRUST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and 
MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY 
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRIKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRIKSEN, as Co-Trustees of the 
[PROPOSED} ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 2 
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HENRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DA \VN 1. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KA.UFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the EST A TE OF 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY F AMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT F AMIL Y TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLlAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III 
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KA TY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
FAMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH 1. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CYNOY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRlC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARBARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the 
SMITH F AMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK. as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
[PROPOSED} ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 3 
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TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABfN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LfNDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE! 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRE1'<'N; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER I 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; , 
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN; GLORIA B. 
SALLADA Y; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
[Proposed] Defendants in 
Intervention. 
COME NOW Defendants in Intervention ("Defendants"), Gladys BABCOCK et at. 
("BABCOCK et at. "), who are lessees of cottage site leases with the State Board of Land 
Commissioners ("Land Board") and the Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL"), by and through 
their counsel of record, HaJJ, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and for their Answer to 
Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint") admit, deny, and 
allege as follows: 
By pleading certain defenses as "affirmative defenses." Defendants do not imply that 
they have the burden of proof for any such defense. In addition, in asserting any of the following 
defenses, Defendants do not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or damage but, to the 
contrary, expressly deny the same. Furthermore, as the Defendants have not had an opportunity 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 4 
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to conduct discovery in this case, the Defendants, by failing to raise an affirmative defense, do 
not waive any such defense and specifically reserve the right to amend their answer to include 
additional affirmative defenses. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in the Complaint except as 
specifically admitted herein. 
1. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs A.2, A.4, and A.5 of the 
Complaint. 
2. Defendants admit that Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the State of Idaho, that 
he is an officer established by the Constitution of the State of Idaho and that Idaho statutes 
govern his responsibilities as such. Those constitutional and statutory provisions speak for 
themselves. 
3. The constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law quoted and referred to by 
Plaintiff throughout his Complaint speak for themselves, must be read in their entirety, and do 
not require admission or denial. 
4. Defendants have insufficient information upon which to base a belief as to the 
allegations in paragraphs l.(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), C.9, C.1O, C.ll, C.12, 0.13, 0.14, D.]5, E.16, 
E.17, E.18, E.19, F.20(a),(b),(c), 0.21 (a),(b), 0.22, H.23, H.24, and 1.25, and for lack of 
information deny the same. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs references to dicta from the Supreme Court of Idaho's recent decision holding 
that Plaintiff was not entitled to a VvTit of prohibition because he had an adequate remedy at law 
are irrelevant. 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION ·5 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff cannot comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 65 and therefore is not entitled 
to a permanent injunction. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has set forth in his Complaint many factual statements as if they were official 
findings of fact when they are nothing more than opinions, inferences, conclusions and 
inadmissible statements which have not been subjected to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint consists of many legal conclusions that are vigorously contested. 
SIXTH AFFIR.\1ATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his Complaint. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, waiver and laches. 
NOTICE 
1. Defendants have filed suit in this Judicial District in Valley County against the 
State Board of Land commissioners and the Department of Lands asserting claims for breach of 
lease and the unconstitutional application of Idaho Code, Section 58-31OA. That action is 
pending before Judge Michael McLaughlin. An accurate copy of the Complaint in that case is 
attached hereto and marked Exhibit A for the Court's information. 
2. The Defendants have filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their breach 
of lease claims in Valley County and the Board of Land Commissioners and the Department of 
Lands have filed a motion to dismiss in that case. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants having fully answered the Complaint, pray for judgment in 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 6 
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their favor and against Plaintiff dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and with costs to the 
Defendants. 
DATED this day of December, 20 to. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
8y: __________________________ ___ 
Phillip S. Oberrecht - Of the Firm 
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants in Intervention 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven L. Olsen 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
Clay Smith 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. JetTerson. 2nd Floor 
POBox 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Fax No. 954-5210 
o U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy (208) 854-8073 
o EmaiJ 
o U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy 
o Electronic Transmission 
mclarkfalhawleytroxell.com 
jashby@hawleytroxell.com 
Phillip S. Oberrecht 
[PROPOSED] ANSWER AND NOTICE IN INTERVENTION - 8 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
ISB #1904, pso@hallfiU:1ey.cQm 
Colleen D. Zahn 
[SB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 127] 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395~8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\4\4-682.IIPLEADINOS\Complllint - Amended.doc 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY; 
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURlNGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN 1. and JANlS G. 
BURKE, as Co~Trustees for the BURKE FAMIL Y 
J 988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELUBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRUST; COLIN 
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RlCHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA 1. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA 1. ANDERSON and 
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; 
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative 
of the EST A TE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. 
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY 
AMENDED COMPLAINT - I 
Case No. CV 2010-436C 
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 
MARJORIE DA Y TRUST~ DAVID THATCHER 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN 
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN·ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRICKSON, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN FAMlLY TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the ESTATE OF 
CHARLES R. KING. JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON~ LEE S. and LEEANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKlNLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA. 
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. orGARA III 
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY 
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KA THY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KA TY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DA VID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES 
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABlAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; 1. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP 
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; 
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN; LINDA S. TURNER; 
GLORIA S, SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT· 3 129 
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS; 
and GEORGE BACON. in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the above-named plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall, 
Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A., and for good cause against the above-named defendants, 
complain and allege as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES 
I. Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County, 
Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant, Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"), 
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land 
Board and promises made to the Land Board. The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and 
remedies with respect to the parcels of real property. 
2. The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of 
the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's 
public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. 
3. Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands 
("Department of Lands"). The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho, 
established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-121, 
Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties, countersigning leases issued by the president 
of the Land Board for rental of state endowment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state 
nonnal schools and the state hospital. 
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II. 
JURlSDICTION aDd VENUE 
4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they all either reside in 
or do business in the state of Idaho. 
Idaho. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court. 
The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County. 
Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401. 
III. 
FACTS 
The Land Board's Constitutional and Statutory Direction 
8. Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide 
for the rental of aU state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such 
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which 
granted. or to the state if not specifically granted. 
9. Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state 
land at a rental amount fixed and determined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307, 
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to 
thirty-five (35) years. 
10. The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real 
property which is leased for recreational residential purposes. Plaintiffs' leases all concerned 
cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases." 
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11. Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be 
applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances, 
Idaho Code § 58-3 J 0 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to 
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore. with the annual rent to be established 
by the Land Board. However, Idaho Code § 58-31OA provides that the conflict auction and 
application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead, 
Idaho Code § 58-3 (OA directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot 
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease. 
Tbe Terms of tbe CurreDtly ExistiDI Cottage Site Leases 
12. The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state 
lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on 
January I, 2001. The existing Jeases will tenninate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board 
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site. 
13. The lease provides for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the 
leased premises, as detennined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation 
is detennined by the assessor. The rent is payable on or before January I of each year, and is 
paid one year in advance. Rent may increase or decrease effective January I of any ca1endar 
year, in accordance with the 2.5% fonnula. 
14. For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites 
are valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on 
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will 
rely on lot values as established by the Valley County Assessor. 
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15. The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold 
approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal. 
16. If a request to renew is denied, the 'ease provides the Land Board will pay 
the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed 00 the leased 
premises. The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the 
improvements on the lease's expiration date. 
] 7. In the event of an ex.piration or tennioation of the lease for any reason 
other than default by the lessee, and in the event Land Board leases the land to a new 
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board 
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or 
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to 
the prior lessee. 
18. The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently 
enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the 
Jease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and 
laws of the state 0 f Idaho or other governmental entities. 
19. The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application 
and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58·310. 
20. Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs 
would be given a right to renew the leases on their current tenns, and that Plaintiffs 
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed 
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or 
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maintain valuable, pennanent approved improvements on the cottage sites. These 
improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use. 
21. On March 16.2010, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for 
the new tenn from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the] .5% increase phased 
in over a 5-year period. 
Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases 
22. In early 2010, Plaintiffs infonned the Land Board, in writing, of their intent to 
exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional 
10 year period, effective January I, 2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same tenns 
set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but 
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less. 
23. On March 12, IS, 16 and 17.2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a form 
letter which was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received 
Plaintiffs' notices renewing their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new 
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs' 
notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenns. 
The Department infonned Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their 
leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board 
in March 2010. 
24. Thereafter, on or about March 31,2010, the Department of Lands mailed 
Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the 
4% rental rate (onnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 20 I 0 meeting. The letter 
advised Plaintiffs that they had until April 30 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00 
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nonrefundable application fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board 
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that 
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue 
the existing lease terms. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused 
renewal ofthe existing lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms. 
25. Plaintiffs thereafter again gave written notice of their intent to renew. In 
exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made 
dear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to 
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made 
on the basis of the existing lease terms. 
26. As of the filing of this Complaint, neither the Department of Lands nor the Land 
Boaed have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage 
site leases. 
27. Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of 
Lands, dated March 31, 2010, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the 
renewal leases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases, 
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value. 
/11/ 
1/1/ 
III/ 
1//1 
/II/ 
/1/1 
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IV. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT J - Breacb of Cootract/Specific PerformaDce 
(RelatiDI to Existiol Cottage Site Leases) 
28. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
29. Plaintiffs entered into a vaJid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage 
sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a J O-year period, with a right to renew under the 
same lease tenns, including the same rental rate. 
30. Plaintiffs. with the approval of the Land Board and/or Department of Lands, 
constructed and/or maintained valuable improvements on their leaseholds. 
31. Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to 
renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease tenns and by statute. 
32. The Land Board has breached the tenns of the contract by refusing to recogJ}ize 
Plaintiffs' right to renew the lease contract under the same tenns, including the same rental rate. 
33. Plaintiffs sutTered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract 
34. Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach 
are inadequate due to the unique nature of the rea) property at issue. 
35. Plaintiffs therefore seek specific perfonnance of the existing cottage site leases, 
including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of 
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period(s) under the tenns present in the existing 
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate. 
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COUNT II - Breach of Contract 
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase or Cottage Site Improvements} 
36. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
37. The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plajntiffs apply to renew their 
leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the 
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of 
the improvements. 
38. The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing tenns, 
including the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land 
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their 
respective lots. 
39. The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it [ntends to 
purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby 
breaching the tenns of its lease with Plaintiffs. 
40. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the 
lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board. 
41. Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and 
either: (a) obtain specific perfonnance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b) 
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on 
their respective leaseholds. 
III1 
I1I1 
1111 
III/ 
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COUNT III - Declaratory Judgmeat 
(Regarding tbe Laad Board's ViolatioD oftbe Idaho CODstitutioD) 
42. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
43. The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4% 
of property value does not secure the maximwn long-tenn financial return to the grantees of the 
cottage sites and/or the state. 
44. By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess 
of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-tenn 
financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from 
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate fannula. 
45. Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are 
interested anellor affected parties under Idaho's Unifonn Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at 
LC. §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217. 
46. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article [X, Section 8 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment 
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of I.C. § 58-310A) 
47. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fulJy set forth herein. 
48. The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for 
the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent. 
49. By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the 
Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites. 
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50. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's 
March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.e. § 58-3 lOA. 
COUNT V - Dedaratory Jgdgment 
(Regardinl tbe Land Board's Unconstitutional Applieation of I.C. § 58-310Al 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though funy set forth herein. 
52. The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage 
sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by I.C. § 58-310A. 
53. The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property 
value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the 
state. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16, 
2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 5B-31 OA. 
COUNT VI -Injunctive Relief 
55. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein. 
56. Plaintiffs will suffer great and/or irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is 
allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew 
their leases on the existing lease terms, or will lose their valuable improvements without 
receiving fair and just compensation. 
57. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the 
Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing 
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms. 
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VII. 
CLAIM FOR A rrORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
58. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & 
Blanton, P.A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney 
fees and costs relative to their prosecution of this action. 
59. Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incUlTed pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements 
and Idaho Code § 12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other contractual provision, 
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action. 
PAA YER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows: 
/ 
I. For a declaratory judgment that the March 16, 2010 decision of the Land Board is 
. 
unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.e. § 58-110A andlor in violation of I.e. § 
58-310A; 
2. For an Order enjoining the Land Board andJor the Department of Lands from 
including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in 
Plaintiffs' existing leases; 
3. For an Order directing the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands to provide 
Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same terms as Plaintiffs' 
existing leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained 
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites; 
4. That, in the event the Court determines the Land Board is entitled to impose a 
new rental rate formula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the 
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opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate fonnula 
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 20 I 0 letter; 
5. That in the alternative, Plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be 
detennined; 
6. That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action; 
7. That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is 
decided by default; and 
8. All other relief which the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this ~ day of November, 20] O. 
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
By: ~\\.~ 
Phillip S. Oberrecht - fthe Finn 
Colleen D. lahn - Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
IS8 #1904, pso@hallfarJey.com 
Colleen D. lahn 
IS8 #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:i4I4-682.I\Wasden v ILB-State Cour1\lntervenc>-Memo.doc 
Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention 
DEC 1 0 JafO 
J_ DAVID NAVAHRQ Clerk 
9y 1:. HC~U=~ . . . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity I 
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. STATE 
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS, 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO INTERVENE 
COME NOW, Proposed Defendants in Intervention, Babcock et al. ("Lessees"), by and 
through the undersigned counsel, and state as follows in support of their Motion to Intervene: 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board") entered into leases (hereinafter 
"the cottage site leases") with each of the Lessees. The leases concern parcels of State 
Endowment Land near and around Payette Lake. The Land Board drafted the leases, which are 
for IO-year periods, beginning on January I, 2001 and ending on December 31, 2010. See 
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Affidavit ofW. Anthony Park ("Park Alf "), ~ 2 and Exh. A. The terms for each cottage site lease 
were substantially similar, and each of the Lessees agreed to the lease terms contained in the 
lease attached as Exhibit "A" to the Park Affidavit. 
The leases provide Lessees with a right to renew the leases, and direct that the Land 
Board will not unreasonably withhold its approval of an application to renew. See Park Aff, 
Exh. A, §§ C.l.1 and K.1.4.b. The leases' renewal provisions were general, and did not set forth 
any different terms for the renewal period, thereby indicating that the lease's general terms 
would carryover in the event of a renewal. I f the Land Board denies a renewal application, the 
lease requires the Land Board to compensate Lessees for the fair market value of Lessees' 
improvements. See Id at § K.I.4.b. 
On March 16, 2010, the Land Board voted to unilaterally impose a different rent term for 
new leases beginning January 1, 20 ll. The change increased the rent formula from 2.5% of the 
appraised value of the leasehold to 4% of a ten-year average of the appraised value. The increase 
from 2.5% to 4% will be phased in over a 5-year period. 
The Lessees timely applied to renew their existing cottage site leases in a \AtTiting sent to 
the Department of Lands within the statutory time period, thereby satisfying the legal 
requirements to renew their leases. See Id, ,4 and Exh. B. In doing so, the Lessees expressly 
reserved their right to renew on the same terms as set forth in the existing lease, including the 
existing rent formula of 2.5%. See Id The Department of Lands later notified the Lessees that it 
refused to recognize Lessees' renewal notices, and stated that Lessees were required to fill out a 
renewal application created by the Department of Lands, which is not a requirement imposed by 
statute or the lease. See Id, , 5 and Exh. C. The Department also stated that renewal would only 
be available on the terms offered by the Land Board in its entirely new lease. See Id. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - 2 
143 
The March 31, 20 I 0 letter included what the Department called a "template" lease. See 
Id. The template was watermarked with the word aTemplate" across the front of each page, did 
not provide any identifying information specific to particular Lessees, and did not contain a 
signature block. See Jd. The Department stated it would contact the Lessees should any action 
be taken by the Land Board that would change the lease template, thus indicating the template 
was simply a draft and potentially subject to further revision. See ld. The Department also 
indicated that in early fall it would send out lease documents for the new leases to those Lessees 
that returned the Department of Lands' form. See ld. 
Out of an abundance of caution and not wanting to give the Department of Lands a 
reason to argue that Lessees failed to timely apply for renewal, Lessees returned the Department 
of Lands' renewal form, reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them by 
the Department of Lands. See /d. at,; 6 and Exh. D. As of the date of this motion Lessees have 
not received new leases. See Id. at ~ 7. However, based on the statements contained in the 
Department of Lands' March 31, 2010 letter and the actions of the Land Board on March 16, 
2010, Lessees believe the new leases will contain new terms, including the increased rent 
formula approved by the Land Board on March 16,2010. See Id. 
In order to protect their lease rights, Lessees filed a lawsuit in the Fourth Judicial District 
in Valley County on October 22, 2010, against the Land Board and Department of Lands. See 
Zahn Al!, Exh. The VaHey County suit alleges two claims for breach of contract-one seeking 
to compel specific performance of the renewal term. including continuation of the 2.5% rent 
formula, and the alternative seeking compensation for site improvements due to the Land 
Board's refusal to renew the current leases. See Exhibit A to Answer and Notice in Intervention, 
~, 28-41. [n addition, that lawsuit alleges the Land Board and Department of Lands have 
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violated Idaho Code, Section 58-310A and Idaho Constitution Article IX, Section 8 by their 
imposition of the new rent formula. See Id., ~~ 42-54. Although said allegations appear similar 
to the allegations of the Attorney General in this case, they are in actuality quite different, for 
they rest on the premise that the new rent formula requires rent payments that will be so high that 
they will not promote stable leases at market rent and hence will not obtain maximum long-term 
financial returns to the state. The parties have filed two dispositive motions in the Valley County 
case, which have not yet been argued or decided: (1) a motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings, 
filed by the defendants; and (2) a motion for partial summary judgment on the contract claims, 
filed by Lessees. 
On December 2, 2010, the Idaho Attorney General filed this suit against the Land Board 
and Department of Lands, seeking relief including an injunction against the Land Board and 
Department of Lands preventing them from renewing Lessees' cottage site leases unless those 
renewals are subjected to conflict auctions. The Attorney General was well aware the Valley 
County lawsuit was pending because over a month prior to filing the present lawsuit, the 
Attorney General was served with copies of the Valley County lawsuit in his capacity as legal 
representative of both the Department of Lands and the Land Board. See LR.C.P. 4(d)(5). For 
unknown reasons, the Attorney General chose not to intervene in the Valley County litigation, 
but instead to institute an entirely new lawsuit in a different county. Further, and despite being 
aware that the Lessees were alleging contractual, statutory and constitutional claims relating to 
the cottage site leases, the Attorney General failed to include as parties the very holders of the 
leases subject to the statute he now seeks to have declared unconstitutional. 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
The Lessees have the right to and should be allowed to intervene in the instant suit, as 
they have protected contractual rights in the leases that are the subject of this suit, and their 
interests are not and cannot be represented by the parties already involved. The Lessees' claims 
share questions of law and fact with Plaintiff Attorney Generals' claims in this suit, and the 
outcome of this suit will likely affect Lessees' lease rights. Therefore, the court should allow the 
Lessees to intervene and allow them to file their Answer and Notice in Intervention. 
A. 
LESSEES' MOTION AND PLEADING ARE TIMELY 
Lessees are entitled to intervene in the instant action as a matter of right under LR.C.P. 
24(a) or, in the alternative, are entitled to intervene upon pennission from the Court pursuant to 
l.R.C.P. 24(b). Intervention must be accomplished by a motion that is "accompanied by a 
pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." I.R.C.P 24(c). 
Lessees have complied with this requirement by submitting contemporaneously herewith a 
[Proposed] Answer and Notice in Intervention, as Exhibit A to the Motion to Intervene. 
Intervention under either Rule 24(a) or 24(b) also requires timely application to the court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held a motion to intervene is timely unless the motion would "delay 
the resetting of the case for trial to the serious detriment of the existing parties." Duff v. Draper, 
96 Idaho 299, 302, 527 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1974). The present lawsuit was tiled only eight days 
ago and, therefore, the instant motion would not cause serious detriment to the existing parties, is 
timely and for the reasons set forth herein should be granted. 
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B. 
LESSEES' INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATE AS OF RIGHT 
Idaho RuLe of Civil Procedure 24(a) permits anyone to intervene in a lawsuit as a matter 
of right when: 
[T]he applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that interest,.unless 
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties. 
I.R.C.P.24(a)(2). 
Intervention as of right is appropriate because the claims asserted by the Attorney 
General relate to the cottage site leases that are the subject of the Lessees' lawsuit against the 
Land Board and the Department of Lands. The Attorney General's claims against the Land 
Board and Department of Lands directly affect the Lessees' continued enjoyment of the rights 
granted by their leases. Should the Attorney General's requested relief be granted, the entire 
process by which the cottage site leases are granted wouLd substantially change. The Lessees 
have a substantial stake in maintaining a suit against the Attorney General in order to protect 
their interest in their current leaseholds. 
Lessees' interests, however, are inadequately represented in the instant litigation without 
intervention. The Attorney General has no pecuniary interest in the leases at issue, but rather is a 
member of the Land Board, the very entity he now seeks to litigate against. The Land Board is 
the lessor of the properties at issue, drafted the cottage site leases, and now seeks to unilaterally 
impose a new lease, including a new rent formula, on the Lessees. Accordingly, both the 
Attorney General's interests and those of the Land Board and Department of Lands are adverse 
to the interests of Lessees. 
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The Lessees have their own unique and direct pecuniary and personal interests in the 
leaseholds at issue and the improvements they 0\\'11 on said leaseholds. See Park Aff., ~ 6. The 
Lessees have timely applied to renew their leases and, therefore, have a stake in protecting those 
interests, which may be adversely affected should the Attorney General's requested relief be 
granted. Therefore, as a practical matter, Lessees' ability to protect their interests would be 
impaired or impeded if they were not permitted to intervene, and they should be al10wed to do so 
as of right. I.R.C.P.24(a). 
C. 
LESSEES' INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATELY PERMITTED 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides for permissive intervention upon timely 
application when an applicant's "claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or 
fact in common." I.R.C.P. 24(b )(2). Permissive intervention is appropriate in the instant action 
because the Attorney General's claims against the Land Board and the Department of Lands 
share common questions of law and fact with Lessees' claims against the Attorney General. All 
of the claims arise out of the same cottage site leases. The Attorney General seeks to have the 
leases subject to conflict auctions; the Land Board and Department of lands seek to change the 
terms of their current lease agreements with Lessees; Lessees seek to enforce the current 
agreements in compliance with Idaho Code, Section 58-310A and Article IX, Section 8 of the 
Idaho Constitution. The Lessees' rights cannot be adequately represented by the existing parties, 
and the Lessees should be permitted to intervene to protect their interests in the continued 
enjoyment of the rights granted under their leases. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Lessees respectfully request that this Court grant them 
leave to intervene as additional party defendants in this matter. 
DATED this @ ~ of December, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
Attorneys for Babcock et al. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ ti'day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven L. Olsen 
Chief of CiviL Litigation Division 
Clay Smith 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P a Box 83720 
Boise. 10 83720 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA WLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Fax No. 954-5210 
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D T elecopy (208) 854-8073 
o Email 
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D Overnight Mai I 
o Telecopy 
D Electronic Transmission 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - 9 
150 
Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
D. John As.'1by, ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5210 
Email: mclark@bawleytroxell.oom 
jashby@haw}eytroxel1.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his 
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. 
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND 
BENEFICIARIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE BOARD OF LAND ) 
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, ) 
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho ) 
Department of Lands, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
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AFFlDAVIT OF GEORGE BACON 
GEORE BACON, being first d1Jly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Director the Idaho Department of Lands. I make this affidavit based 
upon my O\ffi personal knowledge, which is based, in part, on a review of the business records of 
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Idaho Department of Lands that have been kept in the CDurse of the Idaho Department of Lands' 
regular business activity, of which I share custodianship. 
2. In light of the suggestion in the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction that the 2001 Leases be extended, I have calculated the amount of revenue that the 
State ofIdaho would receive from the cottage site leases (1) under the new leases that the Land 
Board intend to execute (the "New Leases"); and (2) under the leases executed in 2001 (the 
"2001 Leases"), if those leases were extended beyond their December 3], 2010 termination date, 
By my calculation, total revenues under the New Leases for the year 2011 would be 
$4,632,956.74. lfthe 2001 Leases were extended, total revenues for the year 2011 would be 
$4,403,863.87. 
3. The above calculations are based on the assumption that all cottage site lessees 
execute the New Leases or agree to extend the 2001 Leases. 
~~==~-----------------
..,.t.... 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this~ day of December, 2010. 
Name: ..;)/J...:514;+J ~'1 
Notary Public for Idaho ....- t\ 
Residing at ,AI'" An'--fA ...J..-..I.J 
My commission expires €'- 30- ~O, I 
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Clay R. Smith 
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P.O. Box 83720 
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Phillip S. Oberrecht 
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The State Board of Land Commissioners and its director, George Bacon (collectively, the 
"Land Board"), submit this memorandum in opposition to the Attorney General's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State endovvrnent lands known as "cottage sites" surrounding Payette Lake and Priest 
Lake are currently leased pursuant to ten-year leases that terminate on December 31, 2010. To 
fulfil1 its duty to maximize returns on endowment lands. the Land Board must enter into new 
leases effective January I, 2011. The Land Board has been engaged in a multi-year process to 
determine the rate to implement with the new leases taking effect on January 1, 2011. On March 
16,2010 the Land Board voted 3-2 to implement a 4% Lease rate. l As required by statute, the 
cottage site lessees have been put on notice of the terms of the new lease, and the Land Board 
intends to, and is ready to, execute the new leases. 
The Attorney General's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief challenges the 
4% lease rate, but that challenge is not the basis of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction at issue 
here. Instead, the only issue before the Court at this time is the Attorney General's request that 
the Land Board be enjoined from executing the new leases. That request is based on the 
eleventh·hour contention that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA, which exempts cottage site leases 
from the "conflict auction" procedures that apply to all other endowment lands, is 
unconstitutional. 
The lease rate is more complicated than a simple percentage of land value in that it takes into 
consideration the average value of the land over a 10 year period and also includes a 
component of "premium rent." For the sake of simplicity, this memorandum generally refers 
to the rental rate approved by the Land Board as the "4% lease rate." A more detailed 
description of the 4% lease rate is set forth below. 
MEMORANDCM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION - 2 
4509C.00032163172 , 
155 
As an initial matter, fundamental principles of separation of pov.'ers do not allow the 
Court to enjoin the actions of the Land Board or to order the Land Board to take any particular 
action. Moreover, there would be no need for the Attorney General's eleventh-hour request for 
injunctive relief if this action had been brought sooner. The Attorney General concluded in an 
August of2009 advisory opinion that Idaho Code Section 58-310A is unconstitutional, yet no 
action was brought at that time to have the statute declared unconstitutiona1. Instead, this action 
was not filed until 29 days before the current leases terminate. 
The Land Board takes no position with regard to the constitutionality of Idaho Code 
Section 58-3] OA. The Land Board is required to comply with that statute unless and until it is 
repealed by the legislature or is determined to be unconstitutional by the Court. 
The Land Board respectfully asks the Court to deny the Attorney General's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. As set forth in more detail below, the injunction requested by the 
Attorney General would only harm the endowment land beneficiaries. The current leases 
terminate on December 31, 2010 and contain no provision for extension. Thus, an order 
enjoining the Land Board from executing new leases would leave the cottage sites unleased and 
would leave the endowment land beneficiaries without a source of revenue from the cottage 
sites. The preliminary injunction would not provide a benefit to any party in that, regardless of 
the Court's decision on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, no conflict auctions can occur 
unless and until Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is declared unconstitutional. 
J]. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Background Of The "Cottage Site" Endowment Lands 
The Idaho Department of Lands is the executive agency established to administer state 
endowment lands. See I.e. § 58-LOl; 58·119. George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho 
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Department of Lands. Complaint" 5. Under Article IX, § 8 of the Idaho Constitution, the Land 
Board is the trustee of public schools, nonnal schools and state hospital endowment lands. The 
Land Board consists of five members: the Attorney General, the Governor, the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, the Secretary of State and the State Controller. See Idaho Constitution, 
Article IX, § 7; Idaho Code § 53-\01. 
The Land Board is the trustee for almost 2.5 million acres of endowment lands granted to 
Idaho at statehood for the purpose of supporting public schools and other public institutions. See 
Affidavit of Bob Brammer, filed concurrently herewith ("Brammer Aff."), Exh. B. Idaho's 
endowment trust assets include 354 lots on Priest Lake and] 68 lots on Payette Lake. Id. The 
State leases the lots, and lessees are authorized to construct and own single-family residences on 
the sites. Id The lots are generally referred to as "cottage sites." 
B. Constitutional and Statutory Background 
Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the Land Board "shall have 
direction, control and disposition of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may 
be prescribed by law." Article IX, Section 8 states that the Land Board shall provide for the sale 
or rental of endowment lands "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such 
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return." 
With regard to the leasing of endo\\ment lands, the Land Board has express statutory 
authority to determine lease rates. See I.C. § 58-304 ("The state board ofland commissioners 
may lease any portion of the state land at a renta] amount fixed and determined by the board."). 
Moreover, the Idaho Administrative Code grants the Land Board discretion to set the annual 
lease rate for cottage site leases. See IDAPA § 20.03.13.026 ("Annual rental shall be set by the 
board from time to time as they deem necessarv.") (emphasis added). 
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To assist the Land Board in exercising its discretion, the Land Board is authorized to 
"appoint and consult with expert advisors for each critical function for which the state board of 
land commissioners has responsibility." I.C. § 58-104(12). One key tool given to the Land 
Board for purposes of detennining an appropriate price at which to buy, sell or lease state lands 
is the Land Board's authority to "cause all lands belonging to the state to be appraised, at such 
times, in such manner and by such means as the board shall decide." I.e. § 58-301. The Land 
Board has broad discretion with regard to the appraisals. Id. ("All appraisements are under the 
contra] of the board, which may approve or disapprove of the same, in whole or in part .... "). 
C. Background of Conflict Auctions and Idaho Code Section 58-310A 
Until 1990, all endowment lands, including cottage sites, were subject to "conflict 
auctions" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 58-310. A "conflict auction" would be triggered 
whenever two or more parties submit applications to lease the same land. In such a case, the 
Department of Lands would auction off and lease the land to the applicant who offered to pay the 
highest premium bid for the lease. ld 
[n ] 990, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, which exempted cottage 
site leases from the conflict auction procedures. There have been no conflict auctions on cottage 
site leases since enactment of Idaho Code § 58·31 OA. 
D. Action Taken By The Land Board To Determine The Cottage Site Rental Rate That 
Will Maximize Long-Term Returns On Endowment Lands 
The cottage sites are currently leased pursuant to ten-year leases that were executed in 
2001 and expire on December 31,2010 (the "2001 Leases"). See Brammer Aff., Exh. A. The 
2001 Leases provide for annual rent of2.5% of the fee simple value of the leased premises, 
adjusted annually based on appraised value (in the case of Priest Lake cottage sites) and assessed 
values detennined by VaHey County (in the case of Payette Lake cottage sites). Id. 
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In recognition of the fact that the 2001 Leases expire on December 3 I, 2010, the Land 
Board has been working for several years to determine the appropriate terms for new leases to go 
into effect on January 1, 2011. The Land Board began this process in 2007 by establishing a 
Cottage Site Subcommittee (the "Subcommittee"), whieh consists of Secretary of State Ben 
Ysursa and Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna. Brammer Aff, Exh. B. 
In an attempt to determine a rental rate that wou1d maximize long-term financial returns, 
the Land Board commissioned several appraisals of the cottage sites and sought the 
recommendations of several experts as to appropriate lease rates. See id. at Exh. B. After 
considering the various appraisals and reports, and after conducting several public meetings to 
consider comments from interested parties, the Subcommittee made a recommenda1ion to the 
Land Board. proposing the following lease rate: 
A target annual lease rent ('"target rent") will be calculated at 4.0% 
of the average appraised value of each lot over the most recent 10 
years (the sum of the i 0 prior years appraised or indexed values for 
each lot divided by 10). Actual rent will increase or decrease 
annually from the prior year's rent at a constant percentage rate to 
reach the target rent in year five. Every five years from the 
effective date of the lease, the actual rent will be recalculated using 
this same methodology and appraised values of the lot for the most 
recent 10 years. Lot values shall be appraised by the applicable 
county assessor or determined by an Idaho Certified Appraiser, at 
the discretion of the Department. At the end of each five year 
period under the lease, the target rent will be calculated at 4.0% of 
the average value for the duration of the lease. 
ld The Subcommittee opined that this rental rate, when combined with a component of 
"premium rent," would "have the effect of maximizing the return to the beneficiaries, and that 
any higher rate would be counterproductive .... " ld. 
During the several meetings leading up to a vote on the terms of the new lease, the 
Attorney General voiced his objections to the 4% lease rate. See Brammer Aff., Exh. C. He did 
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not, however, make any proposal for different terms. ld On .Y1.arch 16,2010, in a 3-2 vote, the 
Land Board approved the Subcommittee's recommendation to implement a 4% lease rate. See 
Brammer Aff., Exh. C, p. 36-37. 
The Land Board is statutorily required to give 6 months notice prior to increasing lease 
rates. See Idaho Code § 58-304. Accordingly, on March 3], 2010, the Idaho Department of 
Lands mailed each cottage site lessee an Application for Use form (the "Application"), which 
included a cottage site lease template for a term beginning January 1, 20 It, with the "rental rate 
provisions approved by the [Land Board] at their March 16, 2010 meeting." See Brammer Aff, 
Exh. D (page 1 of Jetter and page 2 of Template Cottage Site Lease). 
E. Procedural Background 
On March 24, 20lO, the Attorney General filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the 
ldaho Supreme Court. See Affidavit ofO. John Ashby, filed concurrently herewith ("Ashby 
Aff."), Exh. A. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition sought to enjoin the Land Board from 
"signing and implementing so-called 'cottage leases' for rental of state endowment lands held in 
trust for the public schools, normaJ schools and the Idaho State Hospital ... unless and until they 
are leased under terms meeting the requirements of Idaho Constitution, Article IX, § 8." Id. at p. 
2. Specifically, the Attorney General asserted that the Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to 
implement the 4% lease rate was "in excess of its jurisdiction" because it does not "return the 
maximum long term financial return" to the state as required by Article IX, Section 8 of the 
ldaho Constitution and because it does not "insure that each leased lot generates market rent 
throughout the duration of the lease" as required by Idaho Code § 58-3 lOA. See id. at Exh. B, p. 
3-4. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition did not seek any declaration that Idaho Code § 58-310A 
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was unconstitutional. To the contrary, it presumed for purposes of the Writ of Prohibition that 
Idaho Code § 58-31 OA was constitutiona1. Jd. at p. 4. 
The Land Board sought dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition, asserting that the 
Land Board's decision fell within its discretion. On December 1,2010, the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued an opinion dismissing the Writ of Prohibition on grounds that the Attorney General has 
another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary Course of law." See Wasden v. 
Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners, -~. P.3d ---, 2010 WL 4861713 (Idaho, 2010). 
Certain Payette Lake cottage site lessees (the "Payette Lake Lessees") have filed a 
separate action in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of VaHey. Ashby Aff., Exh. C. That action asserts that the 4% lease rate violates 
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code Section 58-310 because that rate is above market rent. Id. 
On December 2, 2010 - just 29 days before the new ten-year leases are to take effect -
the Attorney General filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks to enjoin the Land Board 
from executing the new ten-year leases. 
III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
The party seeking an injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto. Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 5]8, 681 P.2d 988,993-994 (1984). As the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated in Harris, "a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the 
right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." /d, 106 Idaho 
at 5] 8. 
In BOise Development Cu .. v. Idaho Trust & Savings Bank, 24 Idaho 36, 49,133 P. 916, 
919 (1913), the Court noted that "injury, material and actual, and not fanciful or theoretical, or 
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merely possible, must be shown as the necessary or probable result of the action sought to be 
restrained." Furthermore, the Court has held that, "the substantial likelihood of success 
necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot exist 
where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." Harris, 106 Idaho at 
518 (citations omitted). 
In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, courts commonly consider the 
"balance of hardships." See. e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v, Vill, a/Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,542 (1987) 
("In each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect 
on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested [preliminary injunctive] relief."); 
Farm Serv,. Inc, v. United States Steel Corp., 90 Idaho 570, 586, 414 P.2d 898 (1966) ("These 
considerations [relating to the harm the plaintiff claims would result in the absence of a 
preliminary injunction] should be weighed against the injury which may result to the defendant 
during the pendency of the action by the imposition of the temporary injunction, in case it should 
finally be determined that plaintiff was not entitled thereto."). Balancing the hardships involves 
comparing the harm the plaintiff would suffer if an injunction were not entered with the harm the 
defendant would suffer if an injunction were entered, Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542; Farm Serv .• 90 
Idaho at 586. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Fundamental Principles Of Separation Of Powers Prohibit The Court From 
Enjoining A Co-Equal Brancb Of The Government 
Before addressing the merits of this action, the Court should first recognize the 
extraordinary relief sought here by the Attorney General. In this Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, the Attorney General is not asking the Court to review the validity of leases that have 
already been entered into, but rather is asking the Court to enjoin the Land Board from acting in 
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its constitutionally and statutorily granted role as trustee of the endowment lands. Principles of 
separation of power do not allow the Court to enjoin a co-equal branch of the government. In 
Miller v. Meredith, 83 P.2d 206, 207 (Idaho 1938), the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
It seems to us that to keep within the spirit of our Constitution, 
(article 2, § 1) and form of government, which recognizes the 
independence and specific character ofthe 'three distinct 
departments' of government, that the judicial department could not 
attempt to prohibit either of the other departments from acting 
within the recognized scope of their respecti ve branches of the 
government, but that, on the other hand, the legal effect of such 
action after it has been taken may be inquired into by the court. 
Jd. (citations omitted). 
In other words, while the Court may review actions already taken by other branches of 
government, the Court should not direct a co-equaJ branch of government in how it should act 
within the scope of its authority. Id. ~ see also Stale of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 500 
(i866) ("The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President is the 
executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though 
the acts of both, when perfonned, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance."); Idaho Schools 
for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 460, 129 P.3d l199, 1209 (2005) 
(explaining that the Court will not instruct the legislature on how to fund education, but that it 
would review future legislative action taken). 
Article IX, Section 7 ofthe Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code Section 58-304 grant 
authority to the Land Board to lease endowment lands. It is not the role of the Court to instruct 
the Land Board in how to carry out that duty (i.e., by ordering it to "extend" the 2001 Leases as 
requested by the Attorney General) or to preliminarily enjoin the Land Board from executjng 
new leases. Once the Land Board has executed new leases, the Court may review the action of 
the Land Board. Indeed, while the Court's review of the Land Board's action is limited, the 
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Court might even invalidate leases entered into by the Land Board, but the Court should not 
preliminarily enjoin the Land Board or order it to perform any act. 
B. The Land Board Takes No Position With Regard To The Constitutionality Of Idaho 
Code § 58-310A 
The Attorney General's Complaint challenges (1) the constitutionality of Idaho Code 
Section 58-31 OA and (2) the Land Board's March 16, 20 I 0 decision to implement the 4% lease 
rate.2 The Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, is based exclusively on the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58·31 OA. See Brief in Support of Motion for 
Pre1iminary Injunction, p. 2. 
For purposes of this Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Land Board takes no position 
with regard to the constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA. That statute is not the Land 
Board's to defend.3 However, as Constitutional officers of the State, the. Land Board is 
obligated to follow Idaho Code Section 58·31 OA unless and until it is repealed by the legislature 
or invalidated by a Court. 
C. The Motion For Preliminary Injunction Should Be Denied Because It Would Cause 
More Harm Tban Good 
I. Granting The Preliminary InjuDdion Will Provide No Benefit To Any Party 
2 The second and third claims for relief each challenge the March 16, 20 10 decision. More 
specifically, the second claim asserts that the Land Board's action violates Article IX. 
Section 8 of the ldaho Constitution, and the third claim asserts that the Land Board's action 
violates Idaho Code Section 58-310A (alleged in the alternative, in the event that the Court 
concludes that Idaho Code Section 58-3 lOA is constitutional). 
3 As the Attorney General has noted, the duty to defend the validity of legislative action 
generally falls on the Attorney General. See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, p. 2. Given that the Attorney General is challenging the constitutionality of Idaho 
Code Section 58-31 OA, it is unclear who, if anyone, will defend the statute. The Land Board 
reserves its rights to take a position at a later date. 
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The Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction asks the Court to enjoin the 
Land Board "from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases until the constitutionality of 
Idaho Code § 58-310 has been resolved." See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, p. 3. As an initial matter, an order preliminarily enjoining the Land Board trom 
executing new leases will provide no benefit to any party. For purposes of the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, this Court is asked to detennine only the likelihood that the Attorney 
General will prevail on the merits of his contention that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is 
unconstitutional. No final ruling as to the constitutionality of the statute can be made at this 
preliminary stage of the litigation. A final determination of the constitutionality of Idaho Code 
Section 58-3 lOA can be made only upon a motion pursuant to I.R.c.P. 12 or 56. 
The constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA was not at issue in the recent 
Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Nevertheless, Justice Burdick opined in his dissenting opinion 
that the statute is unconstitutional. In doing so, he also explained that the Land Board is required 
to follow Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA unless and until it is declared unconstitutional: 
Although not argued by any party here, I.C. § 58-31OA is clearly 
unconstitutional as - in eliminating the conflict auction procedure 
and instead requiring "market rent" - the legislature encroached 
upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board .... 
However, until declared unconstitutional, I.C. § 58-31 OA must still 
be followed by the Land Board. 
Wasden v. Idaho Stale Board of Land Commissioners, 20]0 WL 4861713 (J. Burdick, 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
The whole point of the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is that the 
Land Board should not enter into leases that are not subject to conflict auctions. At this 
preliminary stage of the litigation, this Court can assess the likelihood of success on the merits, 
but it cannot declare Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA to be unconstitutional. Even if this Court 
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were to grant the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Land Board would 
still be required to follow Idaho Code Section 58~3 lOA unless and until a final determination has 
been made that the statute is unconstitutional. Accordingly, no matter the result of the pending 
motion, no cottage site lease can be subject to conflict auction, at least not until some time after 
the January 1,20 II effective date of any new lease. 
Finally, even if Jdaho Code Section 58-31 OA were to be declared unconstitutional right 
now, there still would be no way to implement conflict auctions for purposes of any lease taking 
effect on January 1, 2011. The statutory deadline for submitting applications that would trigger a 
conflict auction with regard to the new leases has already passed. See Idaho Code Section 58-
307 (hAll applications to lease or to renew an existing lease which expires December 3l of any 
year, shall be filed in the office of the director of the department oflands by the thirtieth day of 
April preceding the date of such expiration."). 
2. Enjoining The Land Board From Executing New Leases Would Harm The 
Endowment Land Beneficiaries 
Any injunction prohibiting the Land Board from executing the new leases would have a 
detrimental effect on the revenue generated by the cottage sites. Simply stated, an order 
enjoining the Land Board from executing the new leases would result in the cottage sites going 
unleased when the current leases expire on December 31,2010. Without leases in place, the 
cottage sites will not earn any revenue. The absence of revenue harms the endowment land 
beneficiaries and prevents the Land Board from complying with its duty to maximize returns on 
endowment lands. 
The Attorney General contends that "[t]he preliminary injunction, if granted, will do 
nothing more than preserve the status quo during the pendency of this litigation." See Brief in 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 3. That contention is simply incorrect. The 
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status quo is that the cottage sites are leased, without conflict auctions, until December 31, 2010. 
If the Land Board is enjoined from entering into new leases, the cottage sites would be left 
unleased, which is neither the status quo nor in anyone's best interests. 
The Attorney General implies that an injunction from executing new leases would result 
in an extension of the 2001 leases. See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 
3 ("The attorney general does not seek relief that would restrain the Land Board from taking 
appropriate action to extend existing leases pending final resolution of the challenge to § 58-
3IONs constitutionality.") (emphasis added), The Attorney General is mistaken that the Land 
Board can simply "extend" the prior leases. The 2001 Leases expressly provide that they 
"terminate December 31, 2010." See Brammer Aff., Exh. A, signature page (emphasis added). 
The 2001 Leases contain no provision that would allow them to be extended as proposed by the 
Attorney General. Jd. 
Even if the Land Board could somehow "extend" the 200] Leases despite the clear 
provision that they "terminate" on December 31. 2010, an extension of the new leases even for 
just one year would cost the endowment beneficiaries $229,092.87. See Affidavit of George 
Bacon, filed concurrently herewith ("Bacon Aff."), ~ 2. Under the new leases, total revenues 
from the cottage sites would be $4,632,956.74. ld If the 200] Leases were extended, total 
revenues would be $4,403,863.87. ld. 
Enjoining the Land Board from entering into new leases would not only leave the cottage 
sites unleased, but it would subject the State of Idaho to a risk of liability to the cottage site 
lessees. The 2001 Leases provide: 
Should LESSEE apply to renew this lease in the manner provided 
by law and such application be denied. then LESSOR shall 
purchase the approved improvements placed or caused to be placed 
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on the leased premises by LESSEE, at the fair market value of 
such improvements as of the effective date of expiration. 
Brammer Aff., Exh. A, ~ l.4.b. 
If the Land Board does not execute new leases, the State of Idaho may be required to 
purchase from the lessees the improvements on the cottage sites. In other words, the State of 
Idaho may be required to pay fair market value for the homes that have been built on the 500+ 
cottage sites. The Payette Lake Lessees have already asserted in their separate lawsuit against 
the Land Board that the Land Board's failure to issue a lease on the terms to which the Payette 
Lake Lessees believe they are entitled will trigger the State ofldaho's obligation to purchase the 
cottage site improvements. Ashby Aff., Exh. C. While the Land Board disagrees with this 
position, an order prohibiting the Land Board from executing a new lease will only strengthen 
the Payette Lake Lessees' position that the State of Idaho must purchase the improvements on 
the cottage sites. 4 
D. This Eleventh-Hour Request For Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied As Untimely 
Courts routinely deny preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs who delay in seeking it. 
See. e.g., Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th CiT. 1985) 
("Plaintiffs long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and 
irreparable hann."); Lydo Enters .. inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d ]2] 1, 12I3~14 (9th Cir. 
] 984) ("A delay in seeking a preliminary injunction is a factor to be considered in weighing the 
propriety of relief. '" A preliminary injunction is sought upon the theory that there is an urgent 
4 This argument should not be construed as an admission that the State of Idaho will have to 
purchase the improvements on the cottage sites if enjoined from issuing ne,,,,' leases. Such a 
determination would have to be made by a Court. The point is that an injunction may have 
far~reaching consequences that are potentially detrimental to the State of Idaho. 
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need for speedy action to protect the plaintiffs rights. By sleeping on its rights, a plaintiff 
demonstrates the lack of need for speedy action.") (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA in 1990. The statute has 
now been in effect for more than 20 Yl;'ars without challenge. The alleged unconstitutionality of 
the statute is not a new development. The Attorney General issued an advisory opinion more 
than 16 months ago opining that "[a] reviewing court likely would conclude the Idaho 
Legislature does not have the authority to exempt leases of state endowment lands for single-
family recreational cottage sites and homesites from the public auction requirement of Article 
IX, § 8, of the Idaho Constitution." See Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 09-1, 2009 WL 2588327 
(August 5, 2009). Despite his conclusion that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is unconstitutional, 
the Attorney General did not bring an action challenging the statute at that time. 
On March 24, 2010, the Attorney General filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the 
ldaho Supreme Court. That action challenged the Land Board's Marcb 16, 2010 decision to 
implement the 4% rental rate, but it did not challenge the constitutionality ofIdaho Code § 58-
310A. To the contrary, the Petition for Writ of Prohibition expressly presumed the 
constitutionality of that statute. See Ashby Aff., Exh. B, p. 4 ("The Attorney General presumes 
the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA for the purpose of this Petition, notwithstanding 
Attorney General Opinion 09-01 (2009), which concludes that Idaho Code § 58-310A is an 
unconstitutional infringement on the Board's constitutional duty to employ public auctions for 
leases of endO\vment lands.") 
The constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA could have been challenged long ago. If 
the Attorney General had brought this action in August of 2009 the constitutionality of the 
statute could have been decided on the merits prior to the January] , 2011 effective date of the 
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new leases. Instead, the Attorney General waited until December 2, 2010 - just 29 days before 
the 200 I Leases terminate - to bring this action. The delay in bringing this action warrants the 
denial of preliminary injunctive relief. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Land Board is ready and able to execute new leases to go into effect on January 1, 
2011, which it must do to comply with its duty to maximize returns on endowment lands. The 
Land Board \\ill execute the new leases unless enjoined from doing so by the Court. For the 
foregoing reasons, the Land Board respectfully asks this Court to deny the Attorney General's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and allow the Land Board to carry out the action that it voted 
to take at the March 16, 20 I 0 Land Board Meeting. 
DATED THIS Jl day of December, 2010. 
HA WLEY TROXELL EN'NIS & HAWLEY LLP 
BY~;B No. 1026 
Stephen C. Smith, ISB No. 7336 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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No. CV OC 1023751 
REPLY BRIEF Il'i SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants (collectively "Land Board" or "Board") make no effort to defend the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31OA in opposing the Attorney General's motion for 
preliminary injunction. They claim that the "statute is not the Land Board's to defend." Opp'n 
Mem. at 11. This claim is remarkable given the Board's unquestioned fiduciary duty under 
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution not only "to provide for the Location, protection, 
sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the 
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state by or from the general government" for the purpose of securing "the maximum long tenn 
financial return to" the affected beneficiaries but also to ensure that that the Legislature honors 
its responsibility to "provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to the state 
shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public 
auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants of land were made." 
See Barber Lumber Co. v. Gifford, 25 Idaho 654, 666, 139 P. 557, 561 (1914) ("[t]he grant of 
lands for the various purposes by the federal government to the state constitutes a trust and the 
state board of land commissioners is the instrumentality created to administer that trust, and is 
bound upon principles that are elementary to so administer it as to secure the greatest measure of 
advantage to the beneficiary of it"). The Land Board, in other words, is not a junior officer 
charged with simply doing what it is told. It has an independent and affinnative duty by virtue 
of its constitutionally-imposed fiduciary status to measure those instructions against, inter alia, 
the mandates in Article IX. Section 8. 
The truth, of course, is that the Land Board does not attempt to defend § 58-310A 
because the statute cannot be defended. The la" .. ·• insofar as it creates a special dispensation for 
the cottage sites from the public auction requirement. plainly violates Article IX, Section 8. The 
Board instead opposes the requested preliminary injunction primarily on the basis that the 
proposed 201 ]-2020 Lease will generate approximately $229,000 more in rent over its first year 
than the current lease arrangement and that. if the requested injunctive relief were granted, the 
cottage sites would remain "unleased" after December 31, 2010 and the State would be exposed 
"to a risk of liability to the cottage site lessees" in the fonn of purchasing approved 
improvements. Opp'n Mem. at 14. 
These arguments-even were they relevant for purposes of a preliminary injunction 
issued under I.R.c.P. 65(e)(1)--do not withstand even cursory scrutiny for at least two reasons. 
First, the Land Board not only has the opportunity hut aJso the duty at its December 21, 2010 
meeting to detennine a course of action that ensures compliance with Article IX, Section 8, and 
thereby avoid the need for further judicial involvement in the fonn of injunctive relief. Second, 
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the Board's position will be no better, and very likely much worse, if it is forced to deal with a 
determination concerning § 58-3 lOA's unconstitutionality after cottage site leases for the 2010-
2020 period are fully executed and in place. The Board, in short, has temporized far too long 
over dealing with the patent inconsistency between Article IX, Section 8 and § 58-310A. No 
purpose is served by putting off the task of bringing management of the cottage site leases into 
constitutional compliance. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1) ONLY REQUIRES THE MOVANT TO ESTABLISH A 
SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS WITH RESPECT 
TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Land Board relies upon Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P .2d 988 
(1984), for the proposition that preliminary injunctive relief sought under lC.R.P. 65(e)(I) 
requires, in addition to a likelihood of success on the merits, proof of irreparable hann if re1ief 
pendente lite js not granted. Opp'n Mem. at 8. The Board misreads Harris. 
The plaintiff in Harris sought relief under both paragraphs (l) and (2) of Rule 65(e). The 
Court stated concerning the first paragraph: 
(A]s to LR.C.P. 65(e)(l) appellants did not demonstrate that based on their 
complaint, they were entitled to the relief they demanded, and as such were likely 
to prevail at trial. The substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate 
that appellants are enticled to the relief they demanded cannot exist where 
complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt. 
106 Idaho at 518,681 P.2d at 993. The Court turned then to subsection (e)(2) and held: 
Neither have appellants carried their burden of proof under I.R.C.P. 
65(e)(2). We have previously stated that "a preliminary mandatory injunction is 
granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that 
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." ... The district court's findings state 
that: "[tlhe evidence clearly indicates that neither of the named plaintiffs nor, for 
that matter, any of the other proposed plaintiffs whose records were presented are 
in danger of any irreparable damage." We agree. The evidence indicated that the 
April 12, 1982, action of the board of county commissioners of Cassia County 
had been reversed and brought current prior to argument on appellants' motion for 
the preliminary injunction. In fact, at the time of oral argument, neither appellant 
had a pending or unpaid application before Cassia County for indigent aid. 
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ld. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Land Board quotes the italicized portion of the 
second sentence in the Court's discussion and improperly attempts to transform it into a 
limitation on relief authorized by the explicit language of subsection (e )(l). I 
The Board does not advance its effort at importing an irreparable harm requirement into 
subsection (e)(1) by citation to decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Opp'n Mem. at 9. The Idaho 
and federal rules depart dramatical1y from each other with respect to preliminary injunctions, 
with the latter containing nothing similar to LR.C.P. 65(e). Although the Supreme Court has 
counseled that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed "as uniformly as possible" 
because the objective underlying Idaho's adoption of the federal rules ''\vas to establish a 
uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho" 
(Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 1] I Idaho 270, 275, 723 P.2d 814, 819 (1986)), it has limited that 
preference to instances where the state rules have been drawn from their federal counterparts. 
Thus, in Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001), it explained: 
The above-quoted language in Chacon stated our preference for interpreting the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in confonnance with the interpretation placed upon the 
same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations in 
which our rules and the federal rules contain identical language. The relevant wording 
of Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure now differs from that of the 
corresponding federal rule, and therefore the interpretations of the two rules will differ. 
There is no basis for hoMing that the phrase "within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action" contained in the Idaho rule should have the same meaning as 
the phrase "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and 
complaint" now contained in the federal rule. 
1 The Board relies selectively upon dissent in Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land 
Comm'rs, 2010 Idaho No. 128, 2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1, 2010), insofar as Justice Burdick 
addressed Rule 65(e). He observed that "the only possible basis upon which Wasden could 
obtain a preliminary injunction is I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1)[] and it is far from certain that Wasden would 
be entitled to relief under that section." Jd., 2010 WL 4861713, at *10. He rejected the 
applicability of subsection (e)(2) because, in his view, "it is obvious that there is no injury to 
Attorney General Wasden in this case." Jd. The Attorney General disagrees over the lack of 
injury to the endowment lands' beneficiaries, but the dissent may have directed this analysis to 
the Attorney General acting other than as a representative for the beneficiaries. In any event, 
Justice Burdick did not incorporate the irreparable harm requirement in subsection (e)(I). 
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136 Jdaho at 796, 41 P.3d at 224. Here, neither the irreparable hann nor the "balance of 
hardships" factor identified as an element of preliminary injunction decision-making by federal 
courts has application to injunction issued under LR.C.P. 65(e)(1). 
II. CONSIDERATION OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND "BALANCE OF 
HARDSHIPS" FACTORS DOES NOT ASSIST THE LAND BOARD 
Even were irreparable harm or the "balance of hardships" relevant criteria under the 
Idaho rule, the result here would not change. Indeed, those considerations counsel strongly 
against the Board's position. 
The Land Board fully understands that the proposed leases are to be issued without 
compliance with the constraints on its authority in Article IX, Section 8. The cottage site 
endov;ment lands' beneficiaries, moreover, have an entitlement to the benefit of the bargain 
struck by the Constitution's framers. It has long been settled that "[v]iolations of a litigant's 
constitutional rights constitute "irreparable hann per se" and tbat "[n]o other injury is required 
for an injunction provided that the other necessary ingredients to relief are present." N. Pa. 
Legal Servs., Inc. v. County of Lackawanna, 513 F. Supp. 678, 687 (M.D. Pa. 1981). Another 
federal district court has observed that U[i]t has repeatedly been recognized by the federal courts 
at all levels that violation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law." 
Cohen v. Coahoma County, 805 F. Supp. 398, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1992). It warrants emphasis that 
the rights at issue here are "personal" to the extent that they attach to particular beneficiaries and 
that, as discussed above, the Board administers the cottage sites as a trustee who must make 
decisions consonant with maximizing long tenn financial returns through public auction-the 
constitutional vehicle for achieving those returns. See Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd., 
133 Idaho 64, 67-68, 982 P.2d 367,370-71 (1999). 
As for "balance of hardships," the Board asks this Court to draw a very difficult calculus 
to conclude that a patent, and essentiaIly admitted, violation of Article IX, Section 8 is 
outweighed in some fashion by the wholly conjectural loss of $229,000 in rent might be 
experienced in 2011. The Board neglects to acknowledge that it has at its December 21 meeting 
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not only the opportunity but also the power to limit lease tenns to one year, see Idaho Code § 58~ 
307( 1), and to begin the process of satisfying the requirement attendant to conducting an auction 
if necessary, see id. § 58-310. The Attorney General does not request in this motion relief 
compelling any specific response from the Board and, instead, only seeks an injunction that will 
free the Board [0 chart a path consistent with its constitutionaJ mandate under Article IX, Section 
8. He does not, in panicular, ask the Court to direct that existing leases be continued. Exactly 
how to address the consequences attendant to a prohibition against issuing the leases prepared in 
response to the March 16, 2010 directive to Defendant Bacon is a matter firmly committed to the 
Board in the first instance. 
The Land Board's discussion of "[p ]rinciples of separation of powers" accordingly adds 
nothing germane to resolution of the present motion. Opp'n Mem. at 10. Again, the Attorney 
General has not requested this Court to issue relief mandating the Board to fashion a specific, 
otherwise discretionary response to a preliminary injunction pTOhibiting execution of the 
previously-prepared ten-year leases. This matter differs in no respect from other instances where 
state officials or agencies are subject to equitable relief that precludes a constitutional or 
statutory violation. As such, it fits squarely within Miller v. Meredith, 59 Idaho 385, 83 P.2d 206 
(1938), where the Supreme Court affirmed a district judgment determining that the State Board 
of Pardons had altered unconstitutionally a prisoner's sentence. 
FinaJly, the Land Board's characterization of this action as an "eleventh hour" request 
substitutes rhetoric for fact. Opp'n Mem. at 15-17. The Board is well aware of the inconsistency 
between Article IX, Section 8 and § 58-3 lOA. That it views the merits of the Attorney General's 
substantive claim compelling resulted in the Board's declination, when offered the opportunity, 
to come forward with any argument contrary to the analysis in the brief supporting the 
preliminary injunction motion. The Land Board had, and has, a continuing duty to carry out its 
endowment-land management duties in a fashion congruent with Article IX, Section 8. It cannot 
be heard to complain of dilatory tactics when called upon to act constitutionally. Rather, it is the 
dilatory tactics of the Board in creating procedural hurdles that has led to the current situation. 
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, . 
The Land Board's feigned concern over the loss of $229,000, given the millions of dollars that 
the beneficiaries stand to lose if its unconstitutional course of conduct continues, is remarkable. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion for pre1iminary injunction should be granted, 
Dated this 14th day of December 2010. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE A TTOR.NEY GENERAL 
BY~· 
'CAYRSMITH 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity 
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI. STATE 
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Case No. CV-OC 2010·23751 
ORDER TO ALLOW BABCOCK 
ETAL.TOINTERVENE 
This matter came before the Court on December 15, 20 I 0, pursuant to the Motion to 
Intervene and supporting documents filed by Babcock, et. aI., the holders of Payette Lake 
Cottage Site Lessees identified on the [Proposed] Answer and Notice of Intervention. The 
Lessees were represented by their counsel, Phillip S. Oberrccht of the firm Hall, Farley, 
Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. The Attorney General was represented by Deputy Attorney General 
Clay Smith. The State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands were 
represented by their counsel of record, Merlyn W. Clark of the firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley LLP. 
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The Court having considered the Motion to Intervene and supporting documents, the 
[Proposed] Answer and Notice in Intervention, the arguments of counsel, the law and rules of 
this Court, and being otherwise fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. The Lessees 
are directed to file their Answer and Notice of Intervention within five (5) days of the date of this 
Order. 
DATED this J1t2 day of December, 20 I O. 
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IN THE DlSTR[CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the 
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY; 
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W. 
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANG:--.I N. BIVENS; 
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES I 
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-
LE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY 
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA 
BROMAGEN TRUST; MONTFORD M. 
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H. 
ANTONIOLl; MARTIN L. and JANIS G. 
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE F AMIL Y 
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX 
THOMAS, as Trustee of the 
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST; 
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI 
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the 
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TReST; COLIN 
GARD'NER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER 
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE 
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. 
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and i 
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; ! 
FRANCINE DIN GEL, as personal represenlative I 
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN Dn-:GEL; JAMES D. I 
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY: 
JACOBS. as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & i 
MARJORlE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER! 
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN I 
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DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the 
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY 
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA 
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND 
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN 
W. GENTRY; GER.."vfAIN R. TARRANT and 
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; 
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. 
HAGER~ JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R. 
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES 
CABIN REVOCABLE LlVING TRUST; LILA 
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT 
MICHAEL HENRJKSEN and JEANNE C. 
HENRIKSEN, as Co-Trustees of the 
HENRIKSEN FAMILY TRUST; CHARLES 
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE 
A. & JOAl' C. HILLARD; WILLlAM and 
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET· 
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J. 
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as 
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL 
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN; 
DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN; 
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as 
personal representative for the EST ATE OF 
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE 
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAl' LARREA; 
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the 
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and 
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEE ANN 
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN 
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN 
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & 
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; 
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I. 
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE; 
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN 
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA, 
as Trustee of the RDW ARD F. O'GARA III 
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982; 
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and 
KIMBERLY A. aSTRaY{; W. ANTHO~Y 
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and 
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.; I 
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
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Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY 
TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and 
KA TY 1. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and 
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; 
DA VID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; 
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 i 
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as: 
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. 
LANCE and CYNOY SALLAOA Y; CHARLES 
and JAl'.'"KIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. 
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. 
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH 
and BARBARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the 
SMITH F AMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK. as 
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN 
TRUST; GREGOR Y and JULIE SURABIAN; 
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE 
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. 
THOMPSON and JLLIE E. THOMPSON; 
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER; 
JO~ L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA; 
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J. 
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER 
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the 
WALKER MARITAL TRUST~ MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE 
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A. 
WREl'.TN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE 
KEMP ARMSTRONG, K.A THY KEMP STEELE, 
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP 
DILLON; EDW ARO E. ZIMMER and AMY H. 
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER 
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5,1998; 
SCZANNE ZIMMEIUvfAN; GLORIA B. 
SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE 
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
I 
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS; ! 
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as ! 
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands, I 
I 
Defendants. ____ --Ji 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs above-named. by and through their undersigned counsel of 
record, and hereby move tbis Court to consolidate into and with this action Case No. CV OC 
1023751, entitled Han. Lawrence G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex 
rei. State of Idaho Endowment Land Beneficiaries v. State Board of Land Commissioners, and 
George Bacon, in his official capacity as Directory of the Idaho Department of Lands, filed in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 
on December 2, 2010. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Consolidate and the Affidavits of W. Anthony Park and Mikela French in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate, filed herewith. This Motion is also supported by the pleadings 
and other papers on file in this matter. 
Per Fourth District Local Rule 11.1, this motion and the pleadings in support thereof have 
been filed today in the Ada County case, Case No. CV OC 1023751. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
By: ~~\\'k 
Phillip S. Oberrecht - Of t e Finn 
Colleen D. Zahn Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
D. John Ashby 
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven L. Olsen 
Chief of Civil Litigation Division 
Clay Smith 
Deputy Attorneys General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
POBox 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
if U.S. r.,·1ail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy 954-5210 
D Electronic Transmission 
mcJark@hawleytroxell.com 
jashbv;tilhawleytroxell.com 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Man 
o Telecopy 854-8073 
o Electronic Transmission 
Colleen D. Zahn 
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